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I. INTRODUCTION 
Path dependence and critical junctures refer to decisive choices and 
events that prompt future trajectories, which are difficult to reverse 
because the progression of the political or institutional consequence 
involves entrenched behavior, anteceding determinations, and an 
elevated cost of altering course.1 Path dependent methodology has been 
applied to diverse topics, such as economic behavior, party system 
dynamics, the incorporation of labor movements, and implementation of 
legislative agendas.2 This article considers how the two primal risk-
averse post-9/11 assumptions-that there was a global al-Qaeda 
network intent on perpetrating numerous catastrophic terror attacks and 
that severe psychological interrogation methods were essential for 
prying details of plots from suspected terrorists to prevent those attacks3 
-initiated a path dependent process that resulted in a rampant violation 
of human rights on suspected terrorists, combatants, and innocent 
people, both in and out of war zones.4 Residing between the two causal 
premises and the result was the intervening variable of advisory memos 
that rationalized illicit interrogation practices5 with loopholes to make 
1. RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DA YID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: CRITICAL 
JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 27-29 
(2002); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251-53 (2000). 
2. Pierson, supra note 1, at 251-54. 
3. Robert Bejesky, A Rational Choice Reflection on the Balance Among Individual 
Rights, Collective Security, and Threat Portrayals Between 9/11 and the Invasion of Iraq, 
18 BARRY L. REV. 31, 34-43 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Rational Choice Reflection]; 
Robert Bejesky, The Utilitarian Rational Choice of Interrogation from Historical 
Perspective, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 327, 330-32 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Utilitarian 
Rational Choice]. 
4. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 386-91; Robert Bejesky, 
Pruning Non-Derogative Human Rights Violations into an Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 
LOY. L. Rev. 821, 823-28 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Pruning]; Robert Bejesky, Closing 
Gitmo: The Epiphany Approach to Habeas Corpus During the Military Commissions 
Circus, 7-10, 20-25 (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Bejesky, Epiphany Approach]; 
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, A National Security Agenda, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 829, 835 
(2010) (speaking of the Bush Administration's interrogation techniques and noting that 
"[ c ]hoices made by earlier administrations are difficult to reverse abruptly, if at all, and as a 
result new approaches evolve slowly."). 
5. See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogations, 66 
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legal restraints inapplicable.6 
Yet if one discards the premises, signified by the reality that the 
first terrorist attack since 9/11 occurred at the 2013 Boston Marathon 
when two bombs exploded and killed three Americans and injured 
dozens more, 7 there has been virtually no credible evidence of sleeper 
cells, realistic plots, or preparation for an attack, 8 and that wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were not persuasively related to imminent threats 
inside American borders; legal advisory memoranda endowed 
government interrogation orders with a facade of legitimacy even as 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1231 (2005); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 5127, 5132 (2010) [hereinafter O'Connell, Responses] (stating that "the 
memo on the Geneva Conventions and other torture memos are replete with errors, 
erroneous reasoning, omissions, and illogic," and the sole plausible "explanation for the 
shockingly poor quality of the memos ... is that the authors intended to reach conclusions 
the law did not support."); see also Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to 
Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 855-61 (2005); Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 348 (2004); Neal K. Katya} & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging 
War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002); 
Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 
(2002). 
6. Linda M. Keller, ls Truth Serum Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 521, 551 (2005) 
( opining that the advice was tantamount to "the power to commit genocide, to sanction 
slavery, to promote apartheid, to license summary execution."); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, 
War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age 
of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 682 (2004) (noting that "lawyers for the Bush 
administration went from the legitimate conclusion that the Geneva Conventions cannot 
easily be applied to many modem conflicts, to the disingenuous and flawed conclusion that 
there were therefore no legal constraints at all on U.S. interrogation practices."). 
7. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Are We Safer from Terrorism? No, But We Can Be, 28 YALE L. 
& Pol'y REv. 419, 419 (2010) (noting that there were no attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11); 
Palash R. Ghosh, Boston Marathon Bombing: A Timeline Of Terrorist Attacks on US 
Targets Since 9/11, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.ibtimes.com/boston-marathon-bombing-timeline-terrorist-attacks-us-targets-
911-l l 93485?ft=k82h2 (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). 
8. Ian S. Lustick, Fractured Fairy Tale: The War on Terror and the Emperor's New 
Clothes, 16 MrNN. J. INT'L L. 335, 338 (2007); The Editorial Board, Indisputable Torture, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/ 17 /opinion/indisputable-torture-of-
prisoners.html?ref=extraordinaryrendition& _r=O (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (stating that a 
recent "independent, nonpartisan panel's examination of the interrogation and detention 
programs" implemented by the Bush Administration found violations of international law 
and stated that there was "no firm or persuasive evidence that they produced valuable 
information that could not have been obtained by other means"); David Cole & Jules Lobel, 
Are We Safer?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2007), available at http://www.latimes.com/la-op-
colel8novl8,0,6931314.story (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (noting that the Justice 
Department claimed that there were 261 "terrorism and terrorism-related" convictions, but 
only two cases "actually involve[ed] attempted terrorist activity."). 
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U.S. integrity was undermined with widespread deprivation of human 
rights.9 However, it is also possible that the memoranda were not a 
consequential intervening cause that modified Bush Administration 
decision-making, but instead human rights abuses may have been the 
foreseeable proximate cause of White House assumptions and 
solicitations for advice. 1° Consider the following causal flow: 
CHART 1 · RESPONSIBILITY DIFFUSION FOR INTERROGATION - --
Bus Administration: 
Preexisting Intent to 
Interrogate in Violation 
oflnternarional Law 
ClassifyAdvice
Under National
Security and Take
Action
•( 
Responsibility Diffusion2; 
Responsibility Diffusion1: Part III Circumstantial 
Part JI Constitutional 1. Nonbinding International Law 
l. Impotent Judiciary Based on Facts
2.Nonbinding International Law 2. Failed State 
3. Unrestricted Commander in Chief 3. Conflict ls International inScope 
4. Necessity and Self-Defense4. Denying
) 5. Classifying Combatants 
Unacceptable 6. Classifying Torture
Acceptable With One Fully Compdling Posicion 
An Aggregation of Specious, Ambiguous, Or Confusing Positions May Prevail 
Chart 1 starts with an administration decision and request and 
the outcome is torture with immunity. Newsweek referenced an 
effective "call for papers" when it reported that President Bush 
petitioned White House lawyers to "find a way to exercise the full 
panoply of powers granted the president by Congress and the 
Constitution: If that meant pushing the boundaries of the law, so be 
9. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-28, 875-76; David Abraham, The Bush 
Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights, 
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 249 (2008) (stating that "the Bush regime is known primarily for 
the international mess it has created as the world's only superpower, and for the way is has 
sacrificed long-accepted legal norms - military and civilian, international and domestic - in
the name of its so-called War on Terror," which led to "domestic repression" and "the 
brutality and denial of legal obligations toward enemy non-Americans."). 
10. Judith Resnick, Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay 
in Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REY. 579, 612 (2010) (stating that "[t]he 
Torture Memos sanctions actions that, as hundreds of pages of reports from an array of 
sources now document, took place."). 
4
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/3
2013] Path Dependent Result of Torture 5 
it." 11 Similarly finding specious that objective legal advice instigated 
interrogation operations, Human Rights Watch emphasized that "there 
is now substantial evidence that civilian leaders requested that 
politically appointed government lawyers create legal justifications to 
support abusive interrogation techniques, in the face of opposition from 
career legal officers."12 In December 2008, the Senate Armed Service 
Committee Report explained that the solicitation "on how to use 
aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of 
their legality, and authorized their use against detainees." 13 Professor 
Jack Goldsmith, who was later appointed to head the Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that was writing legal 
memoranda, stated that the Bush Administration wanted to "act 
aggressively and preemptively," but because officials feared 
prosecution, the solution required having lawyers "find some way to 
make what [Bush] did legal." 14 
Of the thousands of attorneys in the Department of Justice and 
American government, the White House repeatedly summoned the same 
demimonde of lawyers 15 who referred to themselves as the "War 
Council"-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, White House legal 
counsel David Addington, Department of Defense General Counsel 
William J. Haynes, and OLC Deputy Attorney General John Yoo. 16 
11. Evan Thomas, Full Speed Ahead: After 9/ 11, Bush and Cheney Pressed for More 
Power-and Got It. Now, Predictably, the Questions Begin. Behind the NSA Spying Furor, 
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 8, 2006, 7:00 PM), available at 
http://www. thedai lybeast.com/newsweek/2006/01 /08/full-speed-ahead.html (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2013). 
12. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATM ENT OF DETAINEES 2 (July 2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us071 l webwcover _ 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2013). 
13. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF 
DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xii (2008), available at http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/Publications/EXEC%20S UMMAR Y -
CONCLUSIONS_For%20Release_ 12%20December%202008.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2013). 
14. Dan Eggen & Peter Baker, New Book Details Cheney 's Lawyer 's Efforts to 
Expand Executive Power, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2007), available at 
http: //www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007 /09/04/ AR2007090402292.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). 
15. Robert C. Power, Lawyers and the War, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 39, 89-90 (2009). 
16. Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 389, 389, 
392 (2010) (noting that advisory opinions on war-detention, and interrogation were 
"hijacked and dictated by a cabal of four highly placed government lawyers."); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT'L L. 389, 396 (2006) (stating that Bush Administration legal advisors 
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The "War Council" produced legal opinions containing highly 
unpopular advice and the President classified the memos under national 
security so that other government lawyers could not critique the 
consultation prior to the predetermined action being taken. 17 
From witness experiences, Department of Defense 
investigations, congressional hearings, correspondence among top 
officials, and court records, 18 it is clear that military personnel, 
interrogators, and private contractors committed acts amounting to 
torture or inhuman treatment on detainees for several years 19 with the 
full cognizance of Bush Administration officials.20 While top 
policymakers reportedly discarded some of the legal advice,21 the 
damage still resulted in abuses that were condemned by Republicans, 
Democrats, 22 the global community, 23 and the Justice Department's 
Office of Professional Responsibility. 24 
"undermined the ethics of the legal profession and violated the U.S. Constitution and the 
laws of the U.S., which they were sworn to uphold."). 
17. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 68, 
77 (Jeremy Brecher, Jill Cutler, Brendan Smith, eds., 2005) (mentioning that an ACLU 
FOIA lawsuit uncovered classified legal memoranda indicating that the government 
implemented a common plan to execute abhorrent interrogation practices, covered up and 
lied about that scheme, isolated the plan from the law and courts, and rationalized how it 
was legal) [hereinafter IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY]; See Robert Bejesky, National 
Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter's Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
399, 420-26 (2012) (discussing leaked documentation that revealed controversies); See e.g. 
Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the 
Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 45, 85 (2009) (noting that the Bush 
Administration supposedly changed its opinion to treat al-Qaeda and Taliban members with 
some Geneva Convention protections, but this was declassified in January 2005); Michael P. 
Scharf, Accountability for the Torture Memo: International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 321, 342 (2009). 
18. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 104, 107-09, 112-14, 193. 
19. See generally Robert Bejesky, The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of 
Justice, 32 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2013)[hereinafter "Bejesky, Abu Ghraib 
Convictions"]; Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-28, 852. 
20. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Op-Ed, There is No Justification for Torture, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 28, 2004, at Al I ("It is . . . clear that U.S. officials knew the law was being violated 
[during interrogations] and for months, possibly years, did virtually nothing about it."); 
Irene Zubaida Khan, The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Human Rights in the 
Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (stating that the Bush 
Administration "condoned torture."). 
21. 153 CONG. REC. S27303 (Oct. 16, 2007) (reporting that Jack Goldsmith revoked 
legal memos, including those pertaining to warrantless surveillance and the Bybee torture 
memo); See infra notes 239, 244, 291 and accompanying text for additional ostensible 
retractions. 
22. U.S. Senate Democrats, Senate Republican Have Been Outspoken Against 
Torture-Will Their Votes Match Their Rhetoric?, Feb. 13, 2008, available at 
http://democrats.senate.gov/2008/02/13/senate-republicans-have-been-outspoken-against-
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Principal advisors issued opinions for the White House and 
secretary of defense that inverted the law in a broad range of areas,25 
ignored legal precedent, misrepresented laws to achieve a preordained 
result,26 craftily carved loopholes on what was meant by torture, opined 
torture-will-their-votes-match-their-rhetoric/#.UxoZrT9dWa8 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); 
Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, Senate Supports Interrogation Limits, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 6, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/05/ AR2005100502062.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) 
("Forty-six Republicans joined 43 Democrats and one independent in voting to define and 
limit interrogation techniques that U.S. troops may use against terrorism suspects, the latest 
sign that alarm over treatment of prisoners in the Middle East and at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, is widespread in both parties."). 
23. Michael J. Kelly, Responses to the Ten Questions, 35 WM.MITCHELL L. REV. 5059, 
5060 (2009) ("Because of Gitmo, torture at Abu Ghraib prison, the illegal invasion of Iraq, 
and other errors in judgment committed by the Bush administration, America is no longer 
regarded as a leader in human rights and an adherent to the rule of law."); UN Demands 
Prosecution of Bush-Era CIA Crimes, REUTERS, Mar. 4, 2013, available at 
http://rt.com/usa/un-crime-cia-bush-804/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (reporting that "[a] 
United Nations investigator has demanded that the U.S. publish classified documents 
regarding the CIA's human rights violations under former President George W. Bush, with 
hopes that the documents will lead to the prosecution of public officials."); John H. 
Cushman Jr., UN. Condemns Harsh Methods in Campaign Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 28, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/28/politics/28nations.html? _r=O (last visited Mar. 21, 
2014) ("The United Nations official charged with monitoring compliance with international 
prohibitions against torture has sharply criticized several practices adopted by the Bush 
administration in its campaign against terrorism"). 
24. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT: 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES 
RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF "ENHANCED INTERROGATION 
TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 132, 260-61 (2009), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFina1Report090729.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 
2013); Philippe Sands, Poodles and Bulldogs: The United States, Britain, and the 
International Rule of Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1357, 1365 (2009) ( criticizing the poor quality of the 
memos). 
25. Several authors discussed the inversion of the rule of law. JORDAN J. PAUST, 
BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON 
TERROR 86-100 (2007) (stating that top Bush Administration officials knew they were 
engaging in habitual lawbreaking, but they used lawyers to exonerate actions); see generally 
STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (2006); see 
also SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB 
(2004); see generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND 
THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THEW AR ON TERRORISM (2003). 
26. Scharf, supra note 16, at 389; Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive 
Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and 
Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. Rev. 345, 393 (2007) (stating that 
"Yoo and several others in the administration endorsed the theory ... of necessity to violate 
international law."). Over one hundred lawyers, five former members of Congress and 
twelve former judges, contended that the legal advisors transgressed professional 
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that extraordinary defensive measures were imperative for gathering 
information from detainees, and contended that the series of four 
Geneva Conventions that define war crimes and prohibit torture27 were 
inapplicable or unavailing.28 Other scholars went further and called the 
opm1ons "embarrassing," "utterly unjustifiable" legal analyses,29 
teeming with blatant errors, "not an attempt in good faith to assess the 
law,"30 "flout[ing] constitutional principle by establishing law-free 
zones and constitutional black holes," and offering "duplicitous parsing 
of legal obligations. "31 
With the Bush Administration's request for legal memos, 
predetermined preference, receipt of opinions from select lawyers, and 
classification of advice, perhaps the result of torture can be expected. 
The ultimate repercussion of the memoranda was a dissipation of 
responsibility that diminished the likelihood that policymakers would 
confront punishment for torture even though inconsequential 
intervening events do not sunder the chain of causation between an act 
and harm to a victim in tort or criminal law. In short, given the 
consistent bias on pivotal issues when there were alternative 
interpretations of the law, it is not clear that the attorney-advisors were 
obligations because the "memoranda ... ignore and misinterpret the U.S. Constitution and 
laws, international treaties and rules of international law." Lawyers' Statement on Bush 
Administration's Torture Memos addressed to President George W. Bush, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, and Members of Congress (Aug. 2004), available at 
http://uclaprofs.com/petitions/040800torturememos.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
27. Hague Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the 
Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter "Geneva I"]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "Geneva Protocol Additional"]. 
28. See generally infra Part III. 
29. Keller, supra note 6, at 551; Power, supra note 15, at 100 ("As I absorbed the 
opinions, I concluded that some were deeply flawed: sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and 
incautious in asserting extraordinary constitutional authorities on behalf of the President."). 
30. O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5134. 
31. Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow "War": FOIA, The Abuses of Anti-
Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1142 
(2007); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb 
- A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1096-98 (2008) (stating that Bush 
Administration assertions contended there was a right to defy Congressional will, laws, and 
treaties via expansive interpretation of the Commander in Chief clause); Ralph Wilde, Legal 
"Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and 
Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739, 772-76 (2005) (remarking that commentators 
called these areas, such as Guantanamo Bay, a place where law does not apply). 
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relevant when policymakers ostensibly had the intention to do whatever 
they wanted. The article assesses the far from fluky exonerating legal 
positions by dividing the advice into core constitutional arguments (Part 
II), factual extrapolations for Afghanistan (Part Ill), and the use of 
national security secrecy to circumvent more serious condemnation for 
several years (Part IV). 
II. DENYING RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
Legal advisors opined that there are minimal constitutional 
restrictions on executive war powers authority, by espousing a 
capacious and unreviewable political question doctrine, abjuring 
applicability of substantive international law, assuming carte blanche 
for the Commander in Chief authority, and premising that exigency 
obviated the need for reasonable adherence to human rights law. If 
these foundational constitutional assertions had been convincing, 
advisors would have had no rationale for generating fact-specific 
opinions, which will be addressed in Parts III and IV. However, there 
were prima facie weaknesses in the constitutional advice. 
First, the Bush Administration assumed that courts should not 
be involved in restricting government actions during the "war on 
terror," which invariably would abnegate detainees from attaining 
remedial relief for torture or receiving a review for the justification for 
imprisonment via habeas corpus challenges. 32 Pursuant to Marbury v. 
Madison, the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional 
interpretation, but will refrain from "questions, in their nature 
political."33 Courts are not prohibited from hearing cases with relations 
to foreign affairs.34Additionally, a judiciary that too broadly sidesteps 
32. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 841-52; Robert Bejesky, War Powers Pursuant 
to False Perceptions and Asymmetric Information in the "Zone of Twilight," 44 ST. MARY'S 
L.J. 1, 86-87 (2012) [hereinafter "Bejesky, War Powers"] (Yoo contending that the judiciary 
does not have a role in war powers cases despite much contrary evidence). Other denials 
were aimed at foreign petitioners. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. 
Dow Chem., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16, 43-44, 48, 81-82 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (court dismissing 
Agent Orange case brought by Vietnamese plaintiffs against U.S. corporations because it 
would open the federal courthouse to "all of the Nation's past and future enemies," and the 
Bush Administration argued that herbicides were not banned, hearing the case would judge 
Executive war operations, and the Executive position prevailed over potential customary 
international law restrictions). 
33. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 177 (1803); Edwin B. Firmage, The War 
Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 Cow. L. REV. 65, 68 (1977) (noting that 
because there is no political question doctrine in the Constitution, it is a common law 
development). 
34. Lucien J. Dhooge, The Political Question Doctrine and Corporate Complicity in 
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questions with tangential political overtones may forsake constitutional 
responsibilities35 and not serve justice, prevent executive wrongdoing, 
uphold the integrity of the American judicial system, fulfill reciprocal 
obligations to other states, or support the democratically-derived public 
choice of American citizens who heighten human rights. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court disagreed with legal advisors on habeas corpus 
challenges at Guantanamo Bay in a succession of cases-Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, Rasul v. Bush, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. 
Bush.36 
Second, legal advisors attenuated the binding nature of U.S. 
obligations owed to other states under treaties and customary 
international law.37 Obscuring what were personal inclinations of 
appointed agents as institutional dissension, John Yoo stated: "The State 
Department and OLC often disagreed about international law. State 
believed that international law had a binding effect on the President, 
indeed on the United States, both internationally and domestically."38 
Regarding the interpretation of treaties, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, the Bush Administration's first attorney general, wrote that 
the President's "determination against treaty applicability would 
provide the highest assurance" that courts would not entertain charges 
against American agents for violating "Geneva Convention rules 
relating to field conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of 
detainees. "39 
Extraordinary Rendition, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 311, 332 (2007). But see Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 ( 1997) (holding that Congress persons can lack standing 
without a cognizable injury from the President's acts). 
35. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional 
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 535-37 (1966). 
36. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 88. 
37. Tel-Oren v. Lybian Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing J. 
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 287 (6th ed. 1963)) (stating that the law of nations has been 
defined as "the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states 
and in their relations with one another"). 
38. JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 33 (Atl. Monthly Press) (2006); David Scheffer, Tenth Annual Grotius Lecture 
Series: For Love of Country and International Criminal Law, Further Reflections, 24 AM. 
U. INT'L L. REV. 665, 667-68 (2009) (stating that none of the principal legal advisors had a 
distinguished background in international law); Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the 
Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 305, 307-08 (2006) (critiquing 
Posner and Goldsmith and their realist book) ("[N]ormative claims, if valid, would lend 
support to the view that it is wholly permissible for the U.S. government to take a purely 
instrumental stance toward international law, and that its citizens do not have a moral 
obligation to try to prevent their government from doing so.") 
39. Document - USA: Torture, War Crimes, Accountability: Visit to Switzerland of 
Former US President George W. Bush and Swiss Obligations Under International Law: 
10
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Ashcroft's point does not clearly jibe with Supreme Court 
precedent that affirms the President's war powers are circumscribed by 
Congress, jurisprudence that affirms the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter 
of the Constitution,40 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention which makes 
treaties binding on states and required to "be performed by them in 
good faith,"41 or the U.S. Supremacy Clause which states that "all 
Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land. "42 An executive act, legislation, or court 
judgment can prevail over an inconsistent international law provision 
due to the last-in-time rule,43 but transgressing treaty obligations may 
still be an international law violation vis-a-vis other countries.44 There 
is also no evidence that Congress sanctioned the Bush Administration 
for violating the Geneva Conventions or authorizing interrogation 
techniques amounting to torture pursuant to the Joint Resolution for the 
Use of Force, the Patriot Act,45 or other executive war powers 
authority.46 
A constitutional basis for discretionarily abrogating 
international law obligations is sorely lacking when government action 
eventuates into probable violations of }us cogens norms, universal 
jurisdiction crimes, and federal statutes prohibiting torture.47 From this 
Amnesty International 's Memorandum to the Swiss Authorities, AMNESTY INT'L, available 
at http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/009/201 l/en/e82562ec-75c9-4092-9a3a-
d2d51484e67d/amr51009201 len.html (citing position of Ashcroft on Feb. 1, 2002) (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
40. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 10, 64, 86-87. 
41. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI,§ 2. 
43. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED ST ATES § 
111(4) (1987); Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
45. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 134 (2004). 
46. Robert Bejesky, Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions As the 
Achilles' Heel of War Powers, 32 Miss. C. L. REV. 9, 19 (2013) (noting that Congress 
defines the scope of the president's war powers). 
47. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act 
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains."); O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5128 (noting that "[n]o 
government official has 'authority' to violate international law - no government official 
should wish to do so."); Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 
175, 186 (2006) (noting that the advisor's contention that the President's decision 
"concerning the detention of al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners constitutes a 'controlling 
Executive act' that is completely at odds with relevant Supreme Court precedents."); Id. at 
179 ( espousing that the legal advisors "twisted, in small and large ways, international 
11
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vista and the fact that the U.S. law absolutely criminalizes torture,48 one 
should not need to rehash the obvious, but Congress did pass a ban on 
torture in December 2005 by a vote of 90-to-9. However a few days 
later, Bush inserted a signing statement indicating that he would 
interpret the law "in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch."49 
Signing such statements are potentially unconstitutional and the use of 
"unitary" in this context is a solecism,50 but the practical impact was 
that the President was evidently still endeavoring to unilaterally define 
the fact-intensive conditions for detention and interrogation and thereby 
returning to the tantamount supposition that the Executive was not 
subject to constitutional constraints. 
OLC advisors also denied the applicability of customary 
international law when it wrote "customary international law, as a 
matter of domestic law, does not bind the President, or restrict the 
actions of the U.S. military, because it does not constitute either federal 
law made in pursuance of the Constitution or a treaty recognized under 
law."). 
48. United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 5 CAT/C/28/Add.5, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (Feb. 9, 2000), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100296.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 
2013) ("No official of the government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is 
authorized to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official 
condone or tolerate torture in any form. No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a 
justification for torture."); Harold Hongju Koh, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb./Mar. 2008), 
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0801.koh.html (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2013) (Harold Hongju Koh, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, 
and labor, testifying to a U.N. committee in 2000) ("In every instance, torture is a criminal 
offense. No official of the government ... is authorized to commit or instruct anyone else 
to commit torture."). 
49. George W. Bush, President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, Department of 
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 30, 2005), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2013); ALFRED M. McCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 217 (2006); Eric 
Schmitt, Editorial, House Delays Vote on U. S. Treatment of Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A25 (reporting that the White House and the CIA lobbied to exempt 
the CIA from the restrictions). 
50. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 90-92; Jennifer Van Bergen, The Unitary 
Executive: Is the Doctrine Behind the Bush Presidency Consistent with a Democratic State? 
FINDLAW (Jan. 9, 2006), available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060109 _bergen.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2013) (noting that Bush issued 435 signing statements in his first term and used the term 
"unitary" in the statements 95 times, but signing statements could be unconstitutional under 
Chadha and Bowsher). 
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the Supremacy Clause."51 Alternatively, the Restatement (Third) of 
U.S. Foreign Relations Law states "Customary law that has developed 
since the United States became a state is incorporated into United States 
law as of the time it matures into international law."52 Scholars concur 
that torture is universally proscribed and that every state is bound to 
ensure that no one is subjected to torture as a }us cogens norm and 
customary international law. 53 
Third, legal advisors expressed that the President, as 
Commander in Chief, is not bound by law prohibiting torture when 
acting to provide national security and that "any effort by Congress to 
regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would violate the 
Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the 
President. "54 If this position is accurate, international law that forbids 
51. Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzalez, Gen. Counsel to 
the President & William J. Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, 
Memorandum Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 2 
(Jan. 22, 2002), available at www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2013). Courts decide cases based on "the Constitution, laws, and 
treaties of the United States [but do] not ... conform the law of the land to norms of 
customary international law." United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
Yoo wrote that no one previously thought to argue that the President has disregarded 
customary international law. However, there is actually a substantial literature delving into 
the issue. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1226-30 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 815, 844-46 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, The President ls Bound by International Law, 
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987); Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 930 (1986); Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: ls Violation of 
Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321 
(1985). 
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, at chap. 2, Introductory Note; Louis B. Sohn, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8 J. INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS 17, 26 (1967) 
(noting that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which has been called "a part of 
the common law of the world community," together with the Charter of the United Nations, 
has achieved the character of the world law superior to all other international instruments 
and to domestic laws."). 
53. See Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-35; Paust, supra note 26, at 418 (stating 
that "[t]he claim that the President has authority to violate international laws of war, human 
rights law, and domestic legislation is patently unconstitutional and unacceptable."); 
Alvarez, supra note 47, at 186 (calling the torture memoranda "shoddy and incomplete" on 
the question of treaties and a "cavalier" and "reckless" treatment of custom). 
54. Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales re: Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 34-35, 39 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) ("In 
light of the President's complete authority over the conduct of war ... the prohibition 
against torture ... must be construed as not applying to interrogation undertaken pursuant to 
13
Bejesky: How the Commander in Chief's "Call for Papers" Veils a Path Depen
Published by SURFACE, 2013
14 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 41:1 
torture may be facially or upon application unconstitutional any time the 
President issues authorizations to conduct alleged terrorism- or 
combatant-related interrogations that eventuate into detainee abuse.55 
Moreover, the Justice Department could not prosecute interrogators for 
violating the law if interrogators perpetrated torture pursuant to 
directives issued under the Commander-in-Chief authority.56 This 
advice is peculiar when official government investigations revealed, and 
media reports frequently surfaced with interrogators and military 
personnel being accused of significant harm and Bush affirmed that he 
his Commander in Chief authority."). Similarly, in a March 2003 memo, Pentagon General 
Counsel William Haynes concurred and claimed that "in order to respect the President's 
inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign," the prohibition against 
torture "must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his 
Commander-in-Chief authority." Ingrid Arnesen, Detainees Not Covered by Geneva 
Conventions, Report Concluded, CNN (June 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/09/detention.report/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2013); see 
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) 
(critiquing Posner and Goldsmith's realist-oriented book and stating that "[a] policy-maker 
reading the book might well conclude that compliance with international law, such as the 
1949 Geneva Conventions or the Convention against torture, is optional."). 
55. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31 ("Even if an interrogation method arguably were to 
violate Section 2340A, the statute would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached 
on the President's constitutional power to conduct a military campaign."); Dana Priest & R. 
Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST (June 8, 2004), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A23373-2004Jun7 .html (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2013) (noting that the legal advisors asserted that "international laws 
against torture 'may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations' conducted in President 
Bush's war on terrorism."). 
56. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at xviii, xxi-xxii (stating that 
CIA and military officials were concerned about the legality of the methods, but Yoo 
advised that subordinates could not be prosecuted); Bybee, supra note 54, at 35, 31-39 
(contending that U.S. officials carrying out orders could not be held responsible because 
they "would be aiding the President in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities."). 
Yoo contended that "Congress doesn't have the power to 'tie the President's hands in regard 
to torture as an interrogation technique'. . . It's the core of the Commander-in-Chief 
function. They can't prevent the President from ordering torture." Jane Mayer, 
Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary Rendition' Program, 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 114; IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 
89-90 (stating that Haynes's memo asserted that the President could authorize any physical 
and psychological techniques to obtain "intelligence" to protect Americans, and that a 
presidential directive pursuant to wartime powers could be used by interrogators who torture 
suspects to avoid liability); Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to 
Deny Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the 
Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 , 623 (2005) 
(stating that the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum apply an eccentric "theory of ratification" 
that contends that the President has implied constitutional powers to issue orders to make 
actions of his subordinates inherently legal). 
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"never ordered torture"57 and mandated that interrogators "stay within 
U.S. law."58 
If the advice contending that war crime prohibitions did not 
restrict either the Commander-in-Chief authority or derivative acts 
committed by subordinates had been sound, the President would not 
need to refute anything, or direct subordinates to remain within U.S. 
law, because Presidential directives and subsequent subordinate acts 
were above criminal laws restricting torture. Additionally, it is puzzling 
that states contemplated, negotiated, and ratified treaties applicable to 
war and armed combat with provisions that explicitly prohibited 
interrogation and accepted conventions proscribing torture under all 
circumstances, but these obligations were now inapplicable to the U.S. 
President59 when acting as "Commander in Chief," which is activated 
by Congress and foremost germane to directing U.S. troops into armed 
combat. 
Fourth, one of Bybee' s memoranda to Gonzales and Haynes 
also maintained that the Commander in Chief authority prevails over 
international and domestic law because self-defense and necessity can 
permit suspending legal obligations (such as the Geneva 
Conventions),60 allow harsh interrogations, and absolve interrogators 
from criminal liability.61 If the reasonableness of necessity and self-
defense are systematized as philosophical lenses of the world, such as 
with realist views of Thomas Hobbes who emphasized self-preservation 
at one pole and liberalist views of Immanuel Kant who emphasized the 
importance of human dignity at the other pole, Bush nestled closely to 
57. Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics is Disavowed, 
WASH. POST (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A60719-2004Jun22.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
58. President Bush Holds Press Conference Following the G8 Summit, WHITE HOUSE 
(June 10, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040610-36.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2013). 
59. See generally STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY 6 (1999) (stating that "[s]tronger 
states can pick and choose among different rules selecting the one that best suits their 
instrumental objectives," which may only require rationalizations to justify the action 
predominantly for the domestic audience). 
60. Bybee, supra note 51, at 10-15, 27-29; Paust, supra note 26, at 356 (quoting John 
Yoo: "It seems to me that if something is necessary for self-defense, it's permissible to 
deviate from the principles of Geneva [including the prohibition of torture]."). 
61. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31-40; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the 
Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 84 (2005) (stating that if such 
notions are relayed down the chain of command, loose talk regarding necessity and self-
defense might persuade interrogators to conceive that their operations were justified). 
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Hobbesian notions of self-preservation62 and therein impaired the 
opposing Kantian position as those of critics who were "soft on 
terrorism" and who unreasonably desired to limit presidential 
authority. 63 There are several weaknesses in this position. 
First, as the opening chart imparted, the driving perception of 
peril cast by the government into societal discourse may not be a 
rational and sober portrayal. Second, even with a gap between 
perception and reality, the President's core preclusive constitutional 
authority to suspend certain laws and take preemptive action refers to 
responding to an exigent and substantiated jeopardy that imperils the 
nation. 64 The Bush Administration issued annual and ongoing public 
emergency inside the U.S. for several years,65 which was ostensibly 
specious when the country continued to function as usual. The post-
9/ 11 world is not the American Civil War,66 which enveloped two 
62. Samuel Vincent Jones, The Ethics of Letting Civilians Die in Afghanistan: The 
False Dichotomy Between Hobbesian and Kantian Rescue Paradigms, 59 DEPAUL L. Rev. 
899, 905, 907-08, 911-12 (2010); Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L. 
REV. 29, 44-47 (2011) (discussing the division between risk-averse realist and cooperative 
liberalist positions). Rumsfeld justified severe interrogation techniques by calling them 
"hardened criminals willing to kill themselves and others for their cause," and Cheney 
called captives "the worst of a very bad lot. They are very dangerous." PETER IRONS, WAR 
POWERS 248 (2005). 
63. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM 213 (2008). 
64. President Thomas Jefferson stated that the "law of necessity, of self-
preservation, ... [involves] saving our country when in danger." DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S 
CONSTITUTION 193 (2003) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 
20, 1810), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1231, 1231 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)). 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster explained that to use military force requires "a necessity 
of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choices of means, and no moment for 
deliberation." R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 
(1938) (expressing that "acts of self-defense must occur only during the last feasible 
window of opportunity in the face of an attack that is almost certainly going to occur"). 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. 
A/CO NF .183/9 ( July 17, 1998), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) ("A personal 
shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's conduct ... [t]he person 
acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person," or engaged in an act of 
military necessity required for survival that is proportionate to the danger). 
65. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 330-32, 340-41; Bejesky, 
Rational Choice Reflection, supra note 3, at 6-14, 21; Av. Secretary of State (No. 1) [2005] 
2 A.C. [96]-[97] (British high court deciding that post-9/11 laws to respond to terrorism did 
not meet the definition of a public emergency under the ECHR because "[t]he real threat to 
the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws 
and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these."). 
66. Eric K. Yamamoto, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered: Examining the 
Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on Their Sixtieth Anniversary: White (House) 
Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President Accountable for 
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halves of a country seeking domination. Accepting similar conceptions 
of danger might permit any country to suggest national peril during 
criminal crackdowns and to engage in torture, suspend habeas corpus, 
and exonerate the crimes of government officials. 
Third, the Bush Administration engaged in a bait-and-switch by 
stating that interrogation was necessary to thwart terrorism, but 
extended notions of self-defense and necessity inside and outside of war 
zones even though international agreements and customary international 
law expressly prohibit torture outside war zones, and the Geneva 
Conventions additionally prohibit interrogations inside war zones. 67 
Fourth, issuing orders for interrogations that approximate torture and 
violatejus cogens norms are prohibited under all circumstances.68 
III. APPL YING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO AFGHANISTAN 
A. Gainsaying International Law by Factual Application 
As depicted in the last part, the claim that the President, under 
the Commander in Chief authority or other constitutional powers, can 
order subordinates to execute actions that constitute human rights 
violations is unpersuasive.69 Had the constitutional arguments been 
compelling, the legal advisors would not technically have needed to 
offer fact-specific exemptions for Afghanistan that sought the same 
outcome via legal contextualization. However, advisors did offer fact-
intensive positions, including that Afghanistan was a failed state under 
Taliban control, combat in Afghanistan was "international in scope" but 
that the Geneva Conventions were not binding, the characteristics of 
National Security Abuses, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288 (2005) (contending that 
"claims of urgent need" are false and are raised to "justify aggressive actions" and 
individual threat misrepresentations are only "the tip of proverbial iceberg" of a larger 
pattern of misrepresentations.) 
67. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36. 
68. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, art. 2(2), opened for signature Dec. 10. 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
CAT] ("No exceptional circumstance whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification 
of torture."). In October 2004, Theo van Boven, UN Special Rappoteur on torture, 
responded to the Bush Administration's legal arguments involving "necessity" and "self-
defense" as justifications to attain information, and stated: "The condoning of torture is, per 
se, a violation of the prohibition of torture." Many Countries Still Appear Willing to Use 
Torture, Warns UN Human Rights Official, UN DAILY NEWS (Oct. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/27102004.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
69. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-35; Harold Hongju Koh, Friedmann Award 
Essay: A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 642, 648-49 {2005). 
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combatants made them unprotected under the Geneva Conventions, 
approved interrogation techniques were not torture, and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction did not requisition elevated human right protections. If 
claims are sufficiently compelling, or are at least effectively immune 
from discredit, the likelihood of imposing liability for human rights 
abuses is reduced. 
B. Failed State 
In January 2002, legal advisors wrote that the Geneva 
Convention and the U.S. War Crimes Act did not apply to al-Qaeda or 
Taliban captives in Afghanistan because Afghanistan was a "failed 
state."70 The White House rapidly endorsed the opinion,71 but the 
underlying consultation is bothersome for several reasons. 
First, under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, to qualify as a 
state there must be a defined territory, a permanent population, and a 
government in control that can enter into international relations. 72 The 
question of political recognition is separate from state recognition73 and 
even if a state effectively collapses and the government does not 
discharge basic sovereign functions, the international community does 
not typically revoke recognition,74 but recognition can be employed by 
stronger states as a political instrument. 75 Likewise, foreign powers 
70. Bybee, supra note 51, at 2; Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to 
the President, to President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020125.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) 
(stating that international conventions did not apply to Afghanistan because the Taliban "did 
not exercise full control over the territory or over the people" of Afghanistan, "was not 
recognized by the international community," "could not fulfill international obligations," 
and was a militant group rather than a government, which made the Geneva Conventions 
"obsolete" and inapplicable in this new type of war); see also S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1378 (2001) (condemning the Taliban's governance over Afghanistan); Lawrence 
Azubuike, Status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J. 
INT'L. L. 127, 134 (2003); David Akerson & Natalie Knowlton, President Obama and the 
International Criminal Law of Successor Liability, 37 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 615, 633 
(2009). 
71. Paust, supra note 5, at 831. 
72. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 
49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
73. Id. art. 3 (stating that the "political existence of the state is independent of 
recognition by other states"). 
74. Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense 
Post-9/11, 105 A.J.I.L. 244, 249 (2011). 
75. KRASNER, supra note 59, at 15 (noting that weaker states have typically argued that 
recognition should be automatic, whereas stronger states have selectively use recognition as 
a political instrument); Milena Sterio, A Grotian Movement: Changes in the Legal Theory of 
Statehood, 39 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 209, 234-35 (2011) (noting that whether dominant 
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cannot violate another state's sovereign rights even if a state lacks 
recognition 76 because there are different types of sovereignty that do not 
covary; a state can have one form of sovereignty but not another, such 
as by retaining international law and W estphalian rights even when it 
does not exhibit convincing domestic sovereignty or cogent control. 77 If 
the level of violence is an effective indicator, perhaps the Taliban was 
the legitimate government in control and did instill meaningful authority 
prior to the invasion, whereas Afghanistan slid more into a failed state 
status under U.S. occupation because the insurgency and fighting 
became more intense over the past eleven-year occupation. 78 
Second, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE,79 some U.S. allies, 
and other countries officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate 
government in power,80 which means that some states did regard the 
and regional countries grant statehood is telling). 
76. Sterio, supra note 75, at 217-18 (stating that as long as a territory has state 
sovereignty it has a sovereignty shield that a non-state does not necessarily possess); Milena 
Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans, " Secession, and the Great 
Powers' Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137, 148-49 (2010) (noting that there are some 
anomalies where a territory could be treated as a state when it does not possesses the four 
elements or a territory not being treated as a state when the four elements exist). 
77. KRASNER, supra note 59, at 3-4, 12 ("A state with very limited effective domestic 
control could still have complete international legal sovereignty" and be recognized as a 
"juridical equal by other states."). 
78. Stuart Hendin, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights: The Differing 
Decisions of Canadian and UK Courts, 28 WINDSOR REV. L. & Soc. ISSUES 57, 68 (2010) 
(pointing out that from 2005 to 2008, Foreign Policy published a list of "failed states" since 
2005 and Afghanistan has been on the list); Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Afghanistan's 
Insurgency, 32 INT'L SEC. 7, 7-8 (2008) (noting that from 2002 to 2006, insurgent-initiated 
attacks increased by 400%, and insurgent-initiated attacks increased another 27% in 2007); 
Deb Riechmann, Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan Increase, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (July 27, 
2012), available at http://www.newsday.com/news/world/insurgent-attacks-in-afghanistan-
increase-1.3865838 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (insurgent attacks spiked in 2010 and 
exceeded that violence in 2012). Increased violence followed the invasion and occupation. 
As an example of similarly loose treatment in which no attributes of official sovereignty 
existed, in mid-December 2012, the U.S. recognized a purported coalition of rebel groups as 
the representative of the Syrian people. Jessica Golloher, Russia Slams US over its Syria 
Stance, VOA NEWS, (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.voanews.com/content/russia-
criticizes-us-for-recognizing-syrian-opposition/1563252.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
The Assad family has ruled the country for decades. Erin McClam, Who are the Assads? 
Inside the family that has ruled Syria for decades, NBC NEWS.COM (Aug. 30, 2013) 
available at http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/ _ news/2013/08/29/2024 7267-who-are-the-
assads-inside-the-family-that-has-ruled-syria-for-decades?lite (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
79. Srividhya Ragavan & Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detainees from the 
Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 619, 628 (2005). 
80. Joshua S. Clover, Comment, "Remember, We 're The Good Guys": The 
Classification and Trial of the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 359 
(2004). 
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Taliban as the de Jure government. 81 Afghanistan also remained a 
member of international institutions during the 1990s. 82 Denying 
recognition to Afghanistan also seems affected and inconsistent with the 
facts because both the Clinton and Bush Administrations held 
diplomatic relations with the Taliban as they discussed a potential 
contract with multinational energy companies for constructing a trans-
country pipeline.83 Consequently, even without being legally-
recognized or holding membership in organizations, the Taliban was at 
least the de facto government of Afghanistan. 84 
Third, Afghanistan was a party to the Geneva Conventions, 85 
which binds the territory and successive regimes after ratification. 
Legal advisers recognized that Afghanistan had been a party to the 
Geneva Conventions prior to the Taliban coming to power. 86 The 
Geneva Conventions apply during all conflicts and to all combatants87 
and humanitarian law is designed to protect human rights of everyone 
during combat and wars, 88 which obviates the logic that inhabitants of a 
81. Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 539 n.19, 543-44 (2002). Former State Department 
legal advisor William Taft IV wrote, "before, during, and after the emergence of the 
Taliban ... Afghanistan constituted a state." Mayer, supra note 56, at 112. 
82. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 116 (3d ed. 2010). 
83. Robert Bejesky, Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market 
Expectations, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 193, 265-71 (2011) [hereinafter "Bejesky, Geopolitics"]; 
Azubuike, supra note 70, at 133 (stating that the U.S., through the CIA, reportedly helped 
bring the Taliban to power). 
84. Annyssa Bella), Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen, International Law and 
Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 25 (Mar. 2011), 
available at www .icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-881-maslen.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2013) (stating that "the Taliban before and in 2001 ... surely fulfilled the criterion 
of de facto authority over a population"); Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black 
Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1, 7 (2004) ("Before the armed conflict started, the Taliban 
government had been in effective control of Afghanistan."). Examples of de facto states 
include Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, Northern Kosovo, Republika Srpska, Southern Ossetia 
and Taiwan. Sterio, supra note 75, at 226. 
85. lnt'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Signatories to Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited Nov. 11, 2013) 
(Afghanistan signed in 1949 and became a party in 1956). 
86. Bybee, supra note 51, at 10-11, 14-20. 
87. Lawyers' Statement on Bush Administration's Torture Memos addressed to 
President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Members of Congress, supra note 26 ( over 
one hundred legal professionals signing). 
88. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1283, OEA/Ser.LN/11.106, 
doc.6 rev., at 1291 (1999), available athttp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/us 109-99 .html 
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territory cannot derive rights when present in a "failed state."89 
Moreover, it is not clear that Geneva requires Afghanistan to be a party 
for the rules to be binding because Geneva law is non-derogative and is 
not premised on reciprocal compliance, but on obligations owed by and 
to all humankind. 90 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
mandates that all detainees "shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely," which is an assurance that is not subject to the Executive 
discretion of a participant country.91 
Fourth, as a practical argument, Bush's legal advisers 
maintained that a blanket non-suspension approach would be unwise 
because "international law would leave an injured party effectively 
remediless if its adversaries committed material breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions."92 Ergo, irrespective of whether obligations are driven by 
universality, American soldiers could not be guaranteed to receive 
protected treatment from a foe that is not bound to the Geneva 
Conventions when hospitable treatment is normally based on 
reciprocity.93 It is unfortunate that wartime humanitarian abuses can 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (Geneva rights should be viewed broadly because "individual 
rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity"); Mayer, supra note 56, at 114 (A 
former State Department lawyer remarking: "There is no such thing as a non-covered person 
under the Geneva Conventions."); Robert A. Peal, Combatant Status Review Tribunals and 
the Unique Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1634 (2005) (noting 
distinctions between a war and armed conflict, such as the intensity of the violence, and 
capability of the parties to endure sustained fighting). 
89. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/taft.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2013) (responding to Yoo's draft and noting that carte blanche denial of POW 
status to the Taliban, assuming Afghanistan ceased to be a party to Geneva, that the 
president can suspend Geneva's applicability in Afghanistan, and that customary 
international law does not bind the U.S., are all wrong). 
90. Paust, supra note 5, at 815, 830 (calling the January 9, 2002 memo another 
"attempted avoidance of international and domestic criminal responsibility for interrogation 
tactics."); Scharf, supra note 17, at 94-95 (former JCS General Richard Myers explaining: 
"We train our people to obey the Geneva Conventions, it's not even a matter of whether it is 
reciprocated-it's a matter of who we are."). 
91. Paust, supra note 26, at 407; Steyn, supra note 84, at 5 (noting that "[w]hatever 
their status, such prisoners are entitled to humane treatment"); 3 COMMENTARY ON THE 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 35-37 (Jean S. 
Picteted., 1960) (stating that Common Article 3 is "applicable automatically, without any 
condition in regard to reciprocity"); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2005) 
(referencing that the ICRC also interprets Article 3 expansively and reasoned that "nobody 
in enemy hands can be outside the law"); Id. at 2795-96 (holding that Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions applies to all expansive combat between countries and non-state 
actors). 
92. Bybee, supra note 51, at 24-25. 
93. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 43 (reciprocity requirement to provide names of 
21
Bejesky: How the Commander in Chief's "Call for Papers" Veils a Path Depen
Published by SURFACE, 2013
22 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 41:1 
occur, and that both sides of a conflict typically commit human rights 
abuses to varying degrees,94 but given that advisory opinions and Bush 
Administration statements were issued so early after invasion and 
captured detainees were quickly being removed from Afghanistan, one 
might even view that the Bush Administration provided the initial 
predominant signal to combatants in Afghanistan that the U.S. was not 
obligated to treat detainees with full protections.95 This is a costly 
signal for American troops because the Geneva Conventions are the 
most reliable framework that would protect Americans if they were 
captured in a foreign country,96 and compelling arguments can be made 
that the reputational effect for not providing humane treatment is grave. 
C. International in Scope 
Legal advisors concurred that the bulk of the Geneva 
Convention did not apply to protect al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan because Common Article 2 applies to "armed conflict 
individuals detained); id., art. 132 ( obligation to exchange prisoners to the other side when 
hostilities end). Perhaps somewhat baffling with such consternation over reciprocity, is that 
the legal advisors initially contended (and the Bush Administration agreed) that the Geneva 
Conventions were inapplicable to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which insinuates that the foe 
must also not be bound, but Gonzales opined that customary laws of war could still be 
utilized to bring war crimes charges against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for combat in 
Afghanistan. Bybee, supra note 51, at 2-3, 25 ("Taliban troops ... torture. any American 
prisoners ... [t]he U.S. military thus could prosecute Taliban militiamen for war crimes for 
engaging in such conduct."). 
94. MICHAEL IGNA TIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL 115-19 (2004). 
95. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of 
Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMrNOLOGY 711, 758 (2008) 
(contending that when the Bush Administration violated International Humanitarian Law, it 
"provided an added incentive for non-state actors to take the position that IHL does not 
apply to them."). 
96. Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel 
to the President 1 (Jan. 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013) (stating the Geneva Conventions should apply to those captured in Afghanistan and 
failure to do so would "reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the 
Geneva conventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in 
this specific conflict and in general"); Joby Warrick, Administration says Particulars may 
Trump Geneva Protections, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2008), available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-27 /politics/36898081 _ 1 _interrogation-
benczkowski-letters (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). Senator Graham, who opposed the 
administration's detainee policies, remarked that the Geneva Convention "rules we set up 
speak more about us than it does the enemy." Kate Zernike, G.O.P. Senator Resisting Bush 
over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07 /18/washington/18graham.html?pagewanted=all& _r=O 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
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'between two or more of the High Contracting Parties"' and Article 3 
did not apply.97 Common Article 2 refers to conflict with two or more 
opposing states engaged in international armed conflict;98 and Common 
Article 3 applies to non-international armed conflict,99 which by process 
of elimination, applies to any type of conflict not involving two rival 
states, such as combat between government forces and insurgents or 
non-governmental forces. Common Article 3 is consistent with 
ensuring that all persons involved in conflict have human rights and are 
protected. 100 
97. Bybee, supra note 51, at 9 ("[A] non-governmental organization cannot be parties 
to any of the international agreements here governing the laws of war. .. al-Qaeda is not a 
High Contracting Party. As a result, the U.S. military's treatment of al-Qaeda members is 
not governed by the bulk of the Geneva Conventions, specifically those provisions 
concerning POWs."); see also id. at 9-10 (al-Qaeda is a "non-governmental terrorist 
organization" and al-Qaeda and the Taliban were criminal organizations, which meant there 
were no available protections under the Third Geneva Convention.). Gonzales, Haynes, and 
Yoo concurred. Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ I 0/24/international/worldspecial2/24gitmo.html ?pagewanted 
=all&position= (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (Gonzales called the opinion "definitive."). 
Haynes and Yoo contended that "neither the Third nor Fourth Geneva Conventions 
protected al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees captured in Afghanistan," and Bybee contended 
that "neither the federal War Crimes Act nor the Geneva Conventions would apply to the 
detention of al-Qaeda prisoners." Bybee, supra note 51, at 37; Jeremy Waldron, Torture 
and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1691 
(2005) (noting that Yoo contended that the Geneva Conventions "apply to some captives or 
detainees but not to others, and that they do not apply to al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees in 
the war on terror."). On April 4, 2003, Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker concurred 
that the Taliban was not afforded protection under the Geneva Convention because they are 
"unlawful combatants" and that it does not apply to al-Qaeda because al-Qaeda is not a 
contracting party. Paust, supra note 5, at 841-42. 
98. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 
[hereinafter "Geneva II"]. An "armed conflict," whether of an international or non-
international character is "a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Int') Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
99. Article Three applies in "cases of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." Geneva I, supra note 27, 
art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 98, art. 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter "Geneva Ill"]. 
100. See Shannon M. Roesler, The Ethics of Global Justice Lawyering, 13 YALE H.R. 
& DEV. L.J . 185, 208 (2010) (noting that an egalitarian understanding of the law mandates 
that all human beings be regarded with equal worth); see O'Connell, Responses, supra note 
5, at 5132 (noting that "all persons caught up in armed conflict have the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions - all persons"); see also Jordan Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and 
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Citing legal memoranda, Bush announced that he had "the 
authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the 
United States and Afghanistan," but would not presently do so; that he 
accepted legal advice contending that "Article 3 of Geneva does not 
apply to either al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other 
reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common 
Article 3 applies only to 'armed conflict not of an international 
character;"' and that he would still apply provisions of Geneva "to our 
present conflict with the Taliban." 101 
There is substantial precedent to support the position that 
battling terrorism is an international armed conflict requiring Geneva 
protections, 102 but it might have even been logical to announce that 
American operations in Afghanistan did not involve armed conflict of 
Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, 
Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1335, 1351 (2004) (stating that Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions guarantee 
minimum protections, including the right to be free from torture, humiliation, and cruel and 
unusual treatment, and to be treated humanely, and Article 3 applies to all detainees, 
including POWs and unprivileged belligerents). 
101. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to Vice President Dick Cheney, et 
al. (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/CIA.pdf (last visited Nov. 
13, 2013); Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, WHITE HOUSE, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13 .html (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate 
Afghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the [Geneva] Convention, and the President 
has determined that the Taliban are covered by the Convention."). 
102. Comm 'n of Inquiry on Lebanon, Rep. Pursuant to Human Rights Council 
Resolution S-2/1, 55, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2, (Nov. 23, 2006) (finding the fighting 
between Israel and Hezbollah an international armed conflict, substantially because 
Hezbollah was called a "militia belonging to a Party to the conflict."); HCJ 769/02 Public 
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, at 43 [2006], available at 
http://elyonI.court.gov .il/Files _ ENG/02/690/007 I A34/02007690.a34.pdf (holding that 
military operations against terrorism involved an "armed conflict of an international 
character," requiring application of the Geneva Conventions); contra Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006) (calling conflict with al-Qaeda a non-international armed 
conflict); see also Marko Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in 
the War on Terror: Comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings Case, 89 INT'L 
REV. RED CROSS 373, 377-78 (2007), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc _ 866 _ milanovic.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013). Also, if there is a sufficiently substantial connection between a state and a non-
governmental group, then the fighting should be called an international conflict. Sylvain 
Vite, Typology ofArmed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and 
Actual Situations, 91 INT'L REV. RED. CROSS 69, 71 (2009), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013); 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A Judgment on Appeal,, 92-93 , (Int'l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-
aj990715e.pdf (holding that there is an international armed conflict when a non-state group 
is in conflict with another state when the non-state group "belongs to" another state). 
24
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/3
2013] Path Dependent Result of Torture 25 
an international character, perhaps due to the "failed state" allegation, as 
long as one finds that operations involve conflict not of an international 
character, 103 which implicitly still means that basal Geneva Convention 
rights apply. Ultimately, with Bush offering the indecisive comment of 
having authority to "suspend the Geneva Convention"104 and that 
minimal standards of Article 3 did not apply, an impression is 
seemingly implanted that nothing is truly binding and that any 
protection from that origin of zilch appears gratuitous. Ironically 
enough, Bush did not eagerly apply Geneva provisions, 105 but instead 
stated several years later that Article 3 applied. 106 
The other problem stems from the use of heuristics-the 
targeted foe evolved and there was selective use of the phrase "war on 
terrorism" to empower the president on the one hand and reduce 
international law restrictions on the other. Congress passed the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) in September 2001 to 
permit the U.S. military to capture Osama bin Laden and those 
associated with 9/11, which was then expanded to suspected al-Qaeda 
members in Afghanistan, to the Taliban, and to segments of the Afghani 
population that opposed the occupation after the U.S. installed a 
president and established military bases. 107 The United Nations called 
the attack on Afghanistan a "war" between two states, and Bush said the 
attack on Afghanistan was part of a "war on terror" apparently harbored 
those connected to 9/11. 108 Thus, for purposes of unleashing unbridled 
l 03. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.CJ. 14, 64-65, ,, 114-16 (June 27) (holding that the Contras' battle against the 
legitimate government of Nicaragua was a non-international armed conflict, but the U.S. 
involvement in training, equipping, and financing the Contras did not result in effective 
control over the Contras); David Glazier, Playing By the Rules, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV. 
957, 994 (2009) (discussing the battle with al-Qaeda and expressing that "[i]f the choice is 
between the rules governing 'international' and 'noninternational' conflict, then the former 
is clearly the better alternative."). 
104. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 101 (Bush remarking: "Although we never recognized 
the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the [Geneva] 
Convention, and the President has determined that the Taliban are covered by the 
Convention."). 
105. William H. Taft, The Geneva Conventions and the Rules of War in the Post-9/11 
and Iraq World, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 149, 154-55 (2005) (noting that Bush did not 
implement the provisions). 
106. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007) ("Common Article 
3 shall apply to a program of detention and interrogation operated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency.") 
107. Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 83, at 273. 
108. Bush Gives Update on War Against Terrorism, CNN (Oct. 11, 2001), available at 
http://articles.cnn.com/200 l-10-11 /us/gen.bush.transcript_ 1 terror-islamic-nations-
war?_ s=PM: US ("[W]ar against all those who seek to export terror and a war against those 
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moral and legal authority or power and deploying sophisticated 
weaponry and aircraft and the U.S. military under the Commander-in-
Chief authority to combat a formidable army, it is a war, 109 which 
suggests there is an international armed conflict and Article Two should 
have applied inside Afghanistan. 
The inconsistency arises when al-Qaeda as the enemy is 
emphasized to call it a "global" war, but under international law, a state 
cannot be at war with belligerents, insurgents, or non-state actors, such 
as Osama bin Laden. Only Congress can declare war and it technically 
never authorized any broadly construed "war on terror," 110 but Bush 
interpreted the AUMF to assume expansive Commander-in-Chief 
authority for war against "every terrorist group of global reach." 111 
However, because war is a conflict involving at least two opposing 
states, 112 perhaps commentators are correct that "the war on terror" was 
governments that support or shelter them."); Ragavan & Mireles, supra note 79, at 629-30; 
Johannes van Aggelen, The Bush Administration 's War on Terror: The Consequences of 
Unlawful Preemption and the Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of Victims, 42 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 30 (2009) ("Neither of the Security Council resolutions nor NATO's 
September 12, 2001 statement attempted to establish a link between terrorist acts and a 
particular state.") NATO members deployed troops. Kenneth Anderson, United Nations 
Collective Security and the United States Security Guarantee in an Age of Rising 
Multipolarity: The Security Council as the Talking Shop of the Nations, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
55, 68 (2009) ("[NATO] went along to support an ally in a general sense, [but] not because 
they believed this mission was actually core to the NA TO mutual security pact."). 
109. Stephen P. Marks, Branding the "War on Terrorism": Is There a "New 
Paradigm" of International Law? 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 71, 88-89 (2005). 
110. Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking al-Qaeda and Iraq, 56 How. 
L.J. 1, 8-11 (2012) [hereinafter "Bejesky, CFP"]; Paust, supra note 26, at 346; see contra 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2056-57 (2005) (disagreeing with those contending 
that "powers being granted to the President are limited or truncated in some fashion because 
Congress has not declared war" and that "the powers granted to the President in the AUMF 
are limited or truncated in some fashion because conflict with terrorists is not a 'real war."'). 
111. Marks, supra note 109, at 75; Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies 
to Combat Al-Qa'eda, the Taliban, and the Associated Forces - The First Year, 30 PACE L. 
Rev. 340, 344-45 (2010) (stating that the "War on Terror" is "not accurate in what it 
purported to describe" and does not list an enemy); Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming 
Necessity, 61 SMU L. REV. 221, 230 (2008) ("By invoking a so-called 'war on terrorism,' 
government officials seek the availability of exceptional powers to act."). 
112. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN 
OF INEQUALITY, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 21-22 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett 
Publ'g Co. Inc. 1983) (1762) ("War is not therefore a relationship between one man and 
another, but relationship between one state and another. In war private individuals are 
enemies only incidentally: not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers."); YoRAM 
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 5 (4th ed. 2005) ("In all definitions it is 
clearly affirmed that war is a contest between states."). 
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only a metaphor113 that called for improved police work. 114 Whatever 
the invasion of Afghanistan should have been called, and whether it was 
international or non-international conflict, international law does not 
permit denying Geneva Convention protections or grant a right to 
engage in interrogation tactics that may be torture. 115 Nonetheless, the 
bifurcation of the enemy and select use of rhetoric may also have led to 
esoteric assumptions about U.S. military operations in foreign lands and 
another legal loophole that rejected occupation and human rights law, 
which ordinarily guarantee generally-applicable rights even when the 
Geneva Conventions are inapplicable. 
D. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) affirms: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant."116 The 
Bush Administration reduced the ICCPR's jurisdictional applicability 
by omitting the "subject to its jurisdiction" portion of the provision and 
contended that U.S. human rights obligations were only available in the 
"territory of the United States."117 Alternatively, Germany, the U.K., 
Australia, and Belgium all executed documents with the UN that 
recognized that they accepted jurisdiction over actions of their forces 
deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq; 118 U.S. military doctrine requires 
human rights treaties to be followed in foreign stability operations; 119 
113. Brooks, supra note 6, at 716-17; George Anastaplo, September 11th, A Citizen's 
Responses (Continued), 4 LOY. INT'L L. REV. 135, 157 (noting that 9/11 was "a vicious 
assault by a gang of international criminals"); Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, "Global War on 
Terror" is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2009), available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-03-25/politics/36918330 _ 1 _ congressional-
testimony-obama-administration-memo (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
114. Anastaplo, supra note 113, at 154. 
115. CAT, supra note 68. 
116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter "ICCPR"]. 
117. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: United States of America,, 130, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005). 
118. Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 256 n.124 (2010). 
119. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3.07: STABILITY OPERATIONS 1-7 (Oct. 6, 
2008), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2013); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOTNT PUBLICATION 1, JOINT WARFARE OF THE ARMED 
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, at 11-2 (Jan. 10, 1995), available at 
http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/cgi-
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and the Bush Administration's position was inconsistent with existing 
precedent of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 120 the Inter-
American Committee on Human Rights, 121 UN Human Rights 
Committee, 122 and the UN General Assembly, 123 which have affirmed 
that human rights treaties apply beyond a state's territory. 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) precedent is not 
binding on the U.S., but interpretations provide insight and persuasive 
bin/virtcdlib/index.cgi/4240529/FID6/pdfdocs/jel/new _pubs/jp 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013) ( "[Military officials and troops] respect human rights. We observe the Geneva 
Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience."). 
120. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136,, 109 (July 9) (holding that the jurisdiction of 
states "may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory," particularly when there 
is a "constant practice" of exercising control over that territory); Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 39 
(June 21) ("[T]he fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory 
does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law"). The 
Wall advisory opinion states that the Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, 
the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, all 
apply extra-territorially when a state exercises effective control over a foreign territory. 
Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective 
Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by 
Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers, 51 HARV. INT'L 
LJ. 113, 130 (2010); Cleveland, supra note 118, at 259-60 (noting that the ICJ has held that 
either territorial control or "effective control" implicates international legal obligations). 
121. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba), Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. (Mar. 12, 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 532, 533-34 
(2002). ( determining that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were held under the "authority 
and control" of the U.S. military, making human rights treaties applicable); Alejandre v. 
Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Com'n H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L.N/Il.106, doc. 3 
rev. P 25 (1999). 
122. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 80th Sess., May 26, 
2004, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, at,, 2, 9-10 (March 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/478b26ae2.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (ICCPR 
jurisdiction applies, based on reciprocal obligations, to states for "all persons who may be 
within their territory" and "to all persons subject to their jurisdiction" when the party has 
"effective control" over the territory); Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 
52/1979, at 88, 12.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) (holding that "it would be 
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant [ICCPR] as 
to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another 
State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory."); ICCPR, supra note 
116, art. 2(1) (stating that the agreement applies "to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction"). 
123. Patrick Walsh, Fighting for Human Rights: The Applicability of Human Rights 
Treaties to United States' Military Operations, 28 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 45, 53-54 (2009); 
Heidi Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights In the JCRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 268 (2006). 
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precedent to the jurisdictional applicability of human rights via 
"effective control."124 Article 1 of the ECHR employs language 
guaranteeing that all persons shall have secure rights and freedoms 
"within [the] jurisdiction" of the parties. 125 Consequently, the ECHR 
grants protection "to everyone within their jurisdiction,"126 which 
includes extending obligations on a member state when there is 
effective control outside national territory, including for what follows 
after lawful or unlawful military action. 127 
The ECHR addressed case specific facts involving the 
occupation of Iraq and extended ECHR obligations to member states 
due to effective control. 128 With respect to the U.S., the Security 
Council authorized occupation, 129 which inherently affirms effective 
control, including after a new Iraqi government was installed, because 
"territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the 
authority of the hostile army." 130 Scholars may disagree over the point 
at which "war" in Afghanistan turned to occupation. 
124. Cleveland, supra note 118, at 261-66 ( emphasizing that effective jurisdiction is 
consistent with other ECJ cases and that "effective control" is not limited to a state's 
sovereign territory). 
125. Convention for the Protection Of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
I, Sept. 3 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
126. Id. 
127. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-Xll Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, 354-55 (holding that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is particularly appropriate when acts of state "produced effects or 
were performed outside their own territory, where as a consequence of military action 
(lawful or unlawful) the state exercised effective control of an area outside its national 
territory, whether it was exercised directly, through the respondent state's armed forces, or 
through a subordinate local administration"); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 21-
22, 24-25 (ser. A) ( 1995) (holding that that Turkey was in effective control over Cyprus 
because it possessed authority to implement and enforce policies with a military presence of 
30,000 troops, and was liable for upholding human rights in Northern Cyprus). 
128. AI-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. (H.L.) [153] 
( case involving British soldiers apparently killing six Iraqi citizens in Iraq ( one was 
reportedly in a British detention facility)); Dan E. Stigall, Counterinsurgency and Trends in 
the Law of International Armed Conflict, 30 PA. J. INT'L L. 1367, 1373-75 (2009) 
( describing how the Al-Skeini case history depicts some unwillingness within British 
institutions to accept jurisdiction over British acts in Iraq); Abbasi v. Sec'y of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [64], [66], available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1598.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) 
(holding that U.S. detentions of noncitizens, who are "subject to indefinite detention in 
territory over which the U.S. has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the 
legitimacy of his detention before any court of tribunal," were arbitrary and "in apparent 
contravention of fundamental principles"). 
129. S.C. RES. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003)(recognizing obligations 
of the legal status of occupation). 
130. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Oct. 
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Despite all the precedent relating to jurisdictional applicability 
of the ICCPR, it may still be reasonable to interpret from the negotiating 
history and objections that the ICCPR was not always intended to apply 
beyond a state's sovereign territory for military operations, but this is 
because international humanitarian law is required to be followed 
during combat. 131 The problem is rather obvious because the last part 
addressed how the Bush Administration used fuzzy reasoning with 
Article 2 and Article 3 of the Geneva Convention to deny full 
applicability of international humanitarian law. 132 Another method of 
denying international law restrictions is to focus on the characteristics 
of the enemy, which could also deny POW status and advance a policy 
of removing detainees from Afghanistan and transporting them across 
the Atlantic Ocean to Guantanamo; a location with an "ambiguous legal 
status" 133 and that may have been partially relevant to the removal of 
detainees from Iraq 134 and to abductions and Extraordinary Rendition of 
suspected terrorists in other parts of the world. 135 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306, 1 Bevans 631. 
131. Walsh, supra note 123, at 51-52. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIST OF ISSUES TO BE 
CONSIDERED DURTNG THE EXAMTNATION OF THE SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA: RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 32 (Apr. 28, 2006), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68662.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2013) (John Bellinger, State Department legal advisor, remarking that "neither the text of 
the Convention [Against Torture], its negotiating history, nor the U.S. record of ratification 
supports a view that Article 3 of the CAT applies to persons outside the territory of the 
United States"). The CAT requires parties to undertake to prevent in any territory under its 
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to torture as defined in Article 1. CAT, supra note 68, at art. 2( 1 ). 
132. See Human Rights Council, U.N. Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to 
Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism, ,, 99, 101 U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/13/42 (Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/134/99/PDF/G l 013499.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2013) (stating that the Bush Administration decided that human rights law would 
not apply in Afghanistan or in detention centers at Guantanamo Bay and other places around 
the world). 
133. Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional law: 
The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 306 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 
124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698-99 (2004) (holding that overseas detainees could attain relief in U.S. 
courts for habeas corpus violations, and attain civil damages for international law 
violations). It is surprising that the Bush Administration utilized this ambiguous 
jurisdictional status because when the U.S. criminalized torture in 1994 for acts perpetrated 
by U.S. citizens outside the U.S., it was understood that the statute did not apply because 
Guantanamo Bay was "within the definition of the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States." Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the 
Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational 
Considerations 7-8 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/040403.pdf. (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
134. Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith to William H. Taft, IV, et al. (Mar. 19, 2004), 
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E. Classifying Combatants 
1. Legal Advice 
Based on advice from appointed lawyers, the Bush 
Administration announced that Taliban and al-Qaeda members were not 
entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions because of their 
combatant characteristics, but that they should be treated in a way that is 
consistent with the Geneva. 136 Any combatant can be detained to 
prevent them "from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms 
once again," 137 but whether detainees are classified as POWs, civilian 
internees, or "other detainees," can set justifications for long-term 
detention, standards of treatment, and the right to prosecute. 138 There is 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/doj_memo03 l 904.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (stating that 
"protected persons," who may or may not be illegal aliens, could be removed from Iraq 
"pursuant to local immigration law" for a brief but not indefinite period, so long as 
adjudicative proceedings have not been initiated against them"). Alternatively, if a person is 
innocent, this could be a form of kidnapping, and if an individual is a combatant and one 
acknowledges that detainees are "protected" under the Geneva Conventions, they cannot be 
interrogated. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 5-16 (noting the legal 
ambiguities that developed over treaty applicability in Iraq). 
135. Dana Priest & Dan Eggen, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture, THEW ASH. POST (Jan. 
6, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A5 l 726-
2005Jan5.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) (Gonzales affirmed the legal authorization for 
the U.S. to abduct terror suspects throughout the world without regard to foreign 
sovereignty). This can also be viewed as inconsistent with international law. Robert 
Bejesky, Sensibly Construing the "More Likely Than Not" Threshold for Extraordinary 
Rendition 6-7, 10-12 (Apr. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Bejesky, Sensibly 
Construing]. 
136. Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 19, 2002), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/ Jun2004/d20040622doc l.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(stating that al-Qaeda and the Taliban "are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949," but that soldiers should "treat them humanely, and to 
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, [and] in a manner consistent 
with the Geneva Conventions of 1949"); Bush, supra note 101, at ,, 2-3 ("[The U.S. 
military] shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and 
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva, 
[but] the Taliban (and al-Qaeda] detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not 
qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva."). 
137. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
138. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: 
Interrogation, Detention, Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1265 (2005) (noting that these 
classifications are also consistent with military doctrine); Int'l Comm. Red Cross, 
Commentary, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, at art. 46 
(1960) (affording protection to civilians and emphasizing that "protected persons" include 
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disagreement over whether the correct designations under international 
law should be civilians and privileged combatants, 139 meaning that 
anyone other than a combatant designee is by default a civilian. 140 
Instead, the Bush Administration invented a new category called 
"unlawful enemy combatant" to avoid Geneva Convention protections 
that prohibit interrogations141 and criminal prosecutions of captured 
combatants. 142 
OLC opinions even contended that torture should be narrowly 
construed and that prohibitions on interrogation did not apply to "enemy 
combatants."143 Unlawful detentions, prosecutions, or abuse during 
interrogations mandates liability under the Geneva Convention. 144 
"enemy nationals within the national territory of each of the Parties to the conflict and ... 
the whole population of occupied territories"). 
139. Paul B. Stephan, Symmetry and Selectivity: What Happens in International Law 
When the World Changes, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 91, 104 (2009); Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. 
Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War:" The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 68-70 (2003) (noting that only legitimate combatants are entitled to 
POW status). 
140. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 50(1 ); Int'l Comm. Red Cross, 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of I 977 to the Geneva Convention of I 949, 611 1 
1917 (1987); CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME 
OF WAR. GENEVA, 12 AUGUST 1949, COMMENTARY-ART. 4. PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS, 
available at http: //www.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380-600007?0penDocument (last visited Mar. 
21, 2014) ("Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he 
is either a prisoner of war . .. covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the 
Fourth Convention, or ... a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is 
covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands 
can be outside the law."). 
141. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 87, 123; JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, 
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 307 (2012) (stating that "cheating" is the reason for 
Geneva rules that prohibit interrogations because POWs were a prime source of intelligence 
about adversaries in wars preceding the Geneva Conventions); George C. Harris, The Rule 
of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch 
Lawyers in the Wake of 9/1 I, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 409, 432-33 (2005) (noting 
that the OLC did not cite precedent for failing to apply any of the Geneva Convention 
categories). 
142. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 118 (POW s must be repatriated to their respective 
countries after hostilities end); Tug Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a 
Time: A Non Criminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay 
Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 149, 171 (2005). Soldiers are generally not held 
liable for following orders, but there can be prosecutions for crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. lnt'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary of the 
Third Geneva Convention, 419-22 (1994). 
143. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb - Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
689, 707 (2008). 
144. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 131 (no state "shall be allowed to absolve itself or 
any other ... of any liability incurred by itself or by another" for serious breaches of the 
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Legal opinions written by Yoo, Delahunty and Gonzales focused much 
attention on the possibility of prosecution under the War Crimes Act, 
but "[t]heir refutation of its applicability rests solely on the argument 
that the Third Geneva Convention does not protect members of the 
Taliban or al-Qaeda." 145 
2. Distinguishing Combatants 
There were two approaches for denying POW status for actions 
in Afghanistan based on the characteristics of the enemy. The first 
approach included applying Geneva Convention designation elements 
and the second approach involved pointedly determining that those 
deemed to be members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban were not protected. 
First, advisory opinions assume that the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
were "unlawful enemy combatants" because they hid among 
civilians, 146 which can deny POW status under Article 4(A) of the Third 
Geneva Convention because combatants ( 1) are not commanded by 
leaders, (2) do not wear recognizable combat insignia, (3) do not openly 
carry arms, and ( 4) do not obey laws of war. 147 The test is intended to 
Geneva Convention). 
145. Wallach, supra note 56, at 619; Gonzales, supra note 70, at 1-2 (noting that if the 
Geneva Conventions do not apply to the Taliban, there was also a reduced likelihood of 
criminal prosecution of U.S. soldiers and officials under the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 
2441 )); Benjamin G. Davis, Rejluat Stercus: A Citizen's View of Criminal Prosecution in 
U.S. Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military Generals for 
Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 503, 576-
77 (2008). 
146. 151 CONG. REC. 88811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) 
("They do not wear uniforms. They are terrorists. They hide among civilians. They 
cheat."); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 28-29 (2004) (stating that combatants who hide among 
civilians can lose the privileged status, and a civilian can become a combatant and vice 
versa). 
147. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 4(A)(l); see Hague Conventions on Land Warfare of 
1899, ch. I, art. I, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Conventions on Land Warfare of 
1907, ch. I, art. I, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Bush, supra note 101, at 2; Bybee, supra 
note 51, at 9-10 (stating that al-Qaeda members "have attacked purely civilians targets of no 
military value; they refused to wear uniform or insignia or carry arms openly, but instead 
hijacked civilian airliners, took hostages, and killed them; and they themselves do not object 
the laws of war"). The problem with this position is that it discusses broad acts of al-Qaeda 
outside of Afghanistan and assumes culpability based on a perceived nexus that should have 
ultimately been dependent on determinations in military commissions at Guantanamo Bay. 
As of February 2013, "there have been six convictions of Guantanamo detainees by military 
commissions, four of which were procured by plea agreements." Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong. 
Research Serv., R40932, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials and Trials in 
Federal Criminal Court IO (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
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prevent rewarding combatants for hiding among civilians, which can 
place the civilians in harms way and provide an unfair military 
advantage if the opponent is conscientious in not placing civilians in 
danger. 148 
On the one hand, the Taliban must have had some degree of 
structure and unity in command because it was engaged in fighting with 
the Northern Alliance for several years, but members would generally 
not meet the four elements. 149 However, there are alternative 
interpretations of the Geneva Convention requirements that make 
denying POW status controversial. Article 44 of the Protocol 
Additional ( adopted in 1977) provides that anyone "who falls in the 
power of an adverse party shall be a prisoner of war."150 The U.S. is not 
a party to Protocol I, but 173 countries are members to make Protocol I 
an additional source to the Geneva Conventions, 151 which might make 
Protocol I's POW principle customary international law. 152 
148. Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 1025, 1026 (2004); Derek Jinks, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal 
Regime After September 11 ?: Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1493, 1495 (2004) (noting that "the question is how best to encourage fighters to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population"). 
149. United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002); David E. 
Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37 GEO. J. 
INT'L L. 61, 69 (2005). Some commentators did contend that the Taliban was the armed 
forces of Afghanistan, but legal advisers called the Taliban a "loose confederation of militia 
groups." Graham, supra at 68. The Taliban lacked an "organized command structure," and 
"wore the same clothes they wore to perform other daily functions." Memorandum from 
Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales 
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/taliban.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2013); 151 CONG. REC. S8811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Graham) ("We find ourselves in a war with a group of people who are not part of a state or a 
nation. They do not wear uniforms. They are terrorists. They hide among civilians. They 
cheat."); Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Remarks at 
the Chatham House on the Status and Treatment of Taliban and al-Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 
20, 2002), available at h ttp://2001-2009 .state.gov/s/wci/us _releases/rm/2002/8491.htm (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2013) (identifying the elements for the test in the Geneva Conventions and 
agreeing that the Taliban do not meet the test to be granted POW status, but noting that they 
do "have the right to be treated humanely"); See contra Glazier, supra note 103, at 1013 
(stating that some al-Qaeda units might have qualified as POWs because they did wear the 
same camouflage uniforms and openly carried weapons). 
150. Int') Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 85. 
151. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 
membership, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp viewStates= XPages NORMStatesParti 
es&xp treatySelected=4 70 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014 ). 
152. GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LA w: CASES AND MATERIALS, app. c, at 
585-87 (2005). 
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During the negotiations over Protocol I, countries discussed 
terms to address liberation movements and to eliminate colonial powers 
from their countries and developing countries prevailed in eliminating 
the insignia requirement153 so that hostilities could be conducted from 
within civilian populations and belligerents would still have POW 
status. 154 Protocol I adds that "armed forces of a Party" comprise "all 
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates." 155 If the 
Taliban could be granted POW status and there is a sufficient 
relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, 156 then both groups 
could have arguably received POW status. 
Article 44(3) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Convention states that a combatant is not required to wear a uniform 
when "owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot 
so distinguish himself." 157 The invasion of Afghanistan occurred due to 
the acts of 19 hijackers, reportedly because of a plan devised by Osama 
bin Laden, who was apparently in Afghanistan. The Taliban did not 
direct those who were involved in 9/11 158 and perhaps those wielding 
weapons against invading forces acted m self-defense when 
153. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(3); see also Geneva I, supra 
note 27, art. 4(A)( l ),(2) (POW status is applicable to "members of the armed forces of a 
Party" and "organized resistance movements"). 
154. Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving 
Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 683, 724-26 (2009). 
155. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 43(1); INTL. COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, supra note 140, 1663, at 508 (non-state entities "may in certain circumstances 
become Parties to the conflict"). 
156. John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 108 (2011) (stating that it 
"appears now that either the Taliban could not control al-Qaeda, or that al-Qaeda simply 
dictated to the Taliban"); Stephen R. Shalom, Far From Infinite Justice: Just War Theory 
and Operation Enduring Freedom, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 623, at 644 (emphasizing 
that CIA Director George Tenet considered al-Qaeda and the Taliban inseparable). Not all 
agree that there was this tight relationship. Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Unlikely Bedfellows: 
Feminist Theory and the War on Terror, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. l (2009) 
(reporting that "[l]inks between the Taliban and al-Qaeda go beyond the mere territorial, but 
nonetheless are a far cry from the threshold of complete dependence or effective control 
applied in the Nicaragua Judgment," which assessed the relationship between the Contras 
and the Reagan Administration's covert action team); Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, 
Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and 
Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 840 (2005) (noting that the 
Taliban did not seem to have any greater connection to al-Qaeda than providing logistical 
support). 
157. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(3). 
158. Reinold, supra note 74, at 245 (noting that "the Afghan Taliban ... neither 
directed nor controlled the perpetrators of 9/11 "). 
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confronted. 159 There may also be some hypocrisy in not granting POW 
status 160 and Afghanistan's poverty may have made procuring uniforms 
cost prohibitive. 161 
The second general approach for denying POW protections was 
to assume that if individuals could be labeled members of the Taliban 
and or al-Qaeda, they would be designated an "enemy combatant."162 
"Membership" is the determining variable for an "enemy combatant" 
designation, rather than the act perpetrated that preceded capture. Many 
authorities disagreed with the use of the "unlawful enemy combatant" 
label to deny Geneva Convention protections in Afghanistan, 163 
159. Shalom, supra note 156, at 672, 674-75 (mingling with civilians does not absolve 
the U.S. of responsibility to avoid harming non-combatants, but early NGO estimates placed 
Afghani civilian casualties at several thousand). 
160. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(4) (stating that even if a 
combatant does not meet POW requirements or carry arms openly, the individual will 
"nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners 
of war"); Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force I Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 878 
(2010) (noting that some American government officials disclosed that private military 
contractors for some types of operations were advantageous because they do not wear 
uniforms). Given that CIA operations are often covert, CIA agents and assets also do not 
wear uniforms and may commingle with civilian populations. 
161. WORLD BANK, INT'L DEV. Ass'N, OPERATIONAL PoL'Y & COUNTRY SERV. & RES. 
MOBILIZATION DEP'T, OPERATIONAL APPROACHES AND FINANCING IN FRAGILE STATES 2 
(June 2007) (depicting Afghanistan as the eighth poorest country in the world and the 
poorest outside of Africa). 
162. Guantanamo Detainee Process, DEP'T OF DEF., at 2 (Oct. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2013) 
(stating that for purposes of detention at Guantanamo, an "enemy combatant" is "an 
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces 
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This 
includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities 
in aid of enemy armed forces."); Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of 
the Dep't of Def., to Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable (Dec. 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/international-law/enemy-combatants/p5312 (last visited Sept. 24, 2013) 
( defining an "enemy combatant" as "an individual who, under the laws and customs of war, 
may be detained for the duration of an armed conflict. In the current conflict with al Qaida 
and the Taliban, the term includes a member, agent, or associate of al-Qaida or the 
Taliban."); see also Memorandum from L TC Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, to 
Commander, Joint Task Force 170, at Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance 
Strategies, para. 2 (Oct. 11, 2002), reproduced in THE TORTURE PAPER: THE ROAD TO ABU 
GHRAIB 229 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) ("Since the detainees are 
not [Enemy Prisoners of War] EPWs, the Geneva Conventions limitations that ordinarily 
would govern captured enemy personnel interrogations are not binding on U.S. personnel 
conducting detainee interrogations at GTMO."); Ensign Scott L. Glabe, Conflict 
Classification and Detainee Treatment in the War Against al Qaeda, 2010 ARMY L. 112, 
113-15 (noting that there was difficulty in classifying operations against al-Qaeda under the 
Geneva Convention). 
163. Paust, supra note 5, at 829 (pointing out that the Bush White House's use of the 
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extenuate precedent, confuse the categories, 164 and to use Geneva 
Convention definitions not to classify the enemy, but to use 
characteristics of the enemy to construct a new category. 
"Enemy combatant" was not a commonly-used term prior to 
9/11, and there is no reason to believe it was legitimate in this case. 165 
In Ex parte Quirin ( 1942), the Supreme Court called six German 
saboteurs caught on U.S. shores during World War II unlawful enemy 
combatants. 166 The Court pointed out that they were not qualified to be 
POWs because they, "during time of war, pass surreptitiously from 
enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for 
the commission of hostile acts ... " 167 If the intent with using the term 
was to assume that those individuals who entered U.S. territory during a 
world war with an intention to commit terrorism should be extrapolated 
to anyone inside a foreign country that the U.S. invaded, the factual 
. . . 
comparison 1s spurious. 
After much debate over the classification of those detained in 
Afghanistan, in January 2005, the Bush Administration finally 
declassified the legal memo that stated that there was an intention to 
treat members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in a manner consistent with 
the Geneva Conventions. 168 It is unclear why compliance with 
international law should be a classified national secret and it is unclear 
whether this intention was in fact fulfilled in the previous years. The 
term "unlawful combatant" "demonstrate[d] remarkable ignorance of the nature and reach 
of treaties and customary international law ... [because] any member of al-Qaeda who is a 
national of a state that has ratified the relevant treaties is protected by them."); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 549 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (disagreeing with classifying the 
Taliban as unlawful enemy combatants). The Canadian military commented on treatment of 
detainees in Afghanistan: "All the individuals ... captured or detained will be afforded 
humane treatment, according to the standards that are applicable to POWs, and that's 
according to international law." Hendin, supra note 78, at 61. 
164. David Wippman, Comment on Richard Arneson 's Just Warfare Theory and 
Noncombatant Immunity, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 702 (2006) (noting that the proper 
term should have been "unprivileged belligerent"). 
165. Peter Jan Honigsberg, Inside Guantanamo, 10 NEV. L.J. 82, 94 (2010). 
166. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942) (noting that they were individuals 
associated with a country at war with the U.S. and who would engage in acts that would 
support the enemy). 
167. Id. at 31, 35 (holding that an unlawful enemy combatant can be a "spy who 
secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in a time of war, 
seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy ... "). 
168. Scharf, International Law in Crisis, supra note 17, at 85; Laura A. Dickinson, 
Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law 
Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2010) (stating that a new U.S. Army Field Manual 
was adopted in 2006 and eliminated classifications between Prisoners of War and enemy 
combatants and provided that the Geneva Conventions apply to all detainees). 
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definitional maneuvers in Afghanistan were astonishingly parallel to 
what transpired in Iraq. 
The Bush Administration acknowledged that the Geneva 
Conventions clearly applied in Iraq, 169 but for some reason Iraqi 
detainees were subjected to the same incarceration and interrogation 
policies and many were also called "unlawful combatants."170 Security 
Council Resolution 1483 pertained to the occupation of Iraq and cited 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907 as 
applicable during the occupation. 171 The Supreme Court regards the 
Hague Conventions, which have been ratified by over 180 countries, as 
the paramount authority for assessing proper conduct for the law of 
war, 172 and Geneva Convention protections should also apply as a 
matter of customary international law. 173 The Bush Administration 
simply rejected the Conventions and Security Council Resolution 
restrictions in the case of Iraqi detainees. Rumsfeld directed intensive 
interrogation procedures to obtain "actionable intelligence" from Iraqi 
169. See, e.g., Dep't of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media 
Availability En route to Baghdad (May 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3010 (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013) (Rumsfeld stating that "from the beginning" it has been the U.S. government's 
position "with respect to Iraq that the Geneva Conventions apply" and "anyone who is 
running around saying that Geneva Convention did not apply in Iraq is either terribly 
uninformed or mischievous."). In congressional hearings, Senator Levin stated that 
Rumsfeld publicly announced about Iraq on several occasions "that the Geneva Conventions 
apply not precisely, that prisoners are treated 'consistent with, but not pursuant to' [the 
Geneva Conventions]." Review of Department of Defense Detention and Interrogation 
Operations, Hearing on S. 108-868 Before the Comm. on Armed Serv., 108th Cong. (2004), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-l 08shrg96600/html/CHRG-
108shrg96600.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter "Comm. on Armed Serv."]. 
170. Comm. on Armed Serv., supra note 169 (Colonel Warren stating that some 
detainees at Abu Ghraib were being called "unlawful combatants" and that interrogation 
procedures "are not, in and of themselves, in isolation, violations of the Geneva 
Conventions," specifically for "security detainees" under the Fourth Convention). Senator 
Levin itemized interrogation methods approved by Rumsfeld for "unlawful combatants" in 
December 2002, and methods included "nudity, exploiting detainees' fears ... and stress 
positions." Id. Additional interrogation methods were authorized on April 16, 2003. Id. 
General Miller provided interrogation orders when visiting Iraq; "Policy No. I-Battlefield 
Interrogation Team and Facility (BIT/F) Policy" dated 15 July 2003 was produced for Iraq, 
and queried General Fay who admitted that these authorizations "contribute[ d] to the use at 
Abu Ghraib of aggressive interrogation techniques ... " Id. 
171. S.C. Res. 1483, 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). 
172. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603-04; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 
F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
173. Glabe, supra note 162, at 116. Germany did not ratify the 1907 Hague 
Convention, but violations were applied as customary international law. International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Judgment and Sentences, Oct. I, 1946, reprinted in 41 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 172, 248-49 (1947). 
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prisoners 174 and originally justified issuing the interrogation directives 
as necessary methods to fight the "war on terror" 175 even though 
Hussein's regime did not have ties to al-Qaeda. 176 
F. Using Interrogators and Classifying Torture 
1. International Law Prohibits Interrogation 
With legal advice postulating that international law did not 
restrict the Bush Administration's directives under the Commander-in-
Chief authority, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply because 
Afghanistan was a failed state, that the conflict was international but the 
Conventions were not binding and Article 3 was inapplicable, and that 
those categorized as "unlawful enemy combatants" could be denied 
POW protection, it certainly does appear that appointed legal advisers 
strove to meet an ultimate goal of detaining and interrogating prisoners 
without legal ramification. These contentions molded the groundwork 
for what was explicated more directly by White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales. The existence of "novel factual circumstances" does not 
174. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 121; Scott Higham & Joe 
Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at AOl 
(recalling the abuse at Abu Ghraib, stating that interrogations were being used to obtain 
intelligence to "thwart the insurgency in Iraq" and "find Saddam Hussein or locate weapons 
of mass destruction," and that military intelligence officers were using "MPs to help 'set the 
conditions' for interrogation"); R. Jeffrey Smith, Knowledge of Abusive Tactics May Go 
Higher, WASH. POST, May 16, 2004, at AOl (stating that there was "heightened pressures in 
Washington for more robust intelligence-gathering, because of proliferating attacks on U.S. 
forces and the dwindling intelligence on Saddam Hussein's suspected weapons of mass 
destruction"). 
175. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 94, 122, 126-27; JAMES R. 
SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS 63-64 (2004), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013) (stating that interrogation was being used to gather intelligence and that the "failure to 
adapt rapidly to the new requirements of the Global War on Terror resulted in inadequate 
resourcing, inexperienced and untrained personnel, and a backlog of detainees destined for 
interrogation."); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB I (2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0604.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) 
(stating that "the Bush administration ... required that the United States circumvent 
international law . . . " and administration lawyers counseled that "the new war against 
terrorism rendered 'obsolete' long-standing legal restrictions on the treatment and 
interrogation of detainees."). 
176. See generally Bejesky, CFP, supra note 110; Robert Bejesky, Intelligence 
Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44 CREIGHTON L. Rev. 811, 858-59, 877 
(2011) [hereinafter "Bejesky, Intelligence Information"]. 
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mean that government officials can dismiss existing law, 177 but 
Gonzales opined that the war on terrorism required a "new paradigm" 
that rendered "obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of 
enemy prisoners" because of the need to "quickly obtain information 
from captured terrorists and their sponsors. "178 As a categorical 
prohibition without exceptions 179 and with similar restrictions existing 
in U.S. military law for 150 years, 180 Article 17 of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention provides: 
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound 
to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, 
regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent 
information ... No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them 
information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to 
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant 
or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. 181 
The Geneva Convention mandates that prisoners of war be 
humanely treated at all times and requires states to prohibit actions that 
cause death, seriously endanger the health of prisoners, or subject 
detainees to acts of violence, reprisals, intimidation, or "any other form 
177. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
178. Gonzales, supra note 70, at 2; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 175, at 1. 
179. Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 395. 
180. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION, 
at 1-8 (1992), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-
52.pdf#search=%22FM%2034-52%20Field%20Manua1%22 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(stating that "[p]hysical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the 
source's free will ... Torture is defined as the infliction of intense pain to body or mind to 
extract a confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure," and "US policy expressly 
prohibits acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, threats, 
insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation."); U.S. 
WAR DEP'T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE 
FIELD, SECTION I, ART. 16 (1863), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/0/286696dfc21 d967 ec 12563cd00514a91 ?OpenDocument (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that the 1863 Instructions for the Government of Armies of 
the United States (Lieber Code) stated that "[m]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty-
that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or 
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions"); see also David Luban, 
Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (2005); BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1528 (8th ed. 2004) (defining torture as "the infliction of intense pain to 
the body or mind to punish, or to extract a confession ... or to obtain sadistic pleasure"). 
181. Geneva I, supra note 27, at art. 17; Aaron E. Garfield, Note: Bridging a Gap in 
Human Rights Law: Prisoner of War Abuse as "War Tort, " 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 725, 748-49 
(2006). 
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of coercion" to attain information, 182 but these conditions were 
systematically violated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. 183 
Geneva Convention provisions require prisoners to be given adequate 
food and water to maintain good health, sufficient clothing and 
footwear, sanitary facilities, and medical attention, 184 but the Bush 
Administration overtly violated convention provisions by issuing 
directives that upset detainees' psychological and physical conditions, 
stripped them naked, and tasked health care professionals to facilitate 
interrogations. 185 
2. Distinguishing Between Torture and Cruel and Inhuman 
Treatment 
As for the degree of abuse, trends and policy intentions indicate 
that there should be no sharp distinction between torture and cruel and 
unusual punishment, 186 but legal advisors issued memos that sustained 
the use of harsh interrogations by obfuscating distinctions between 
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. 187 These 
prohibitions on interrogation are applicable during a period of armed 
182. Geneva I, supra note 27, arts. 13, 17. 
183. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 17-31, 60-64; Bejesky, 
Epiphany Approach, supra note 4, at 6-11, 20-25. 
184. Geneva I, supra note 27, arts. 26-30. 
185. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 35-36. 
186. Koh, supra note 69, at 642 ("Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
are both illegal and totally abhorrent to our values and constitutional traditions. And no 
constitutional authority licenses the President to authorize the torture and cruel treatment of 
prisoners, even when he acts as Commander-in-Chief."); ABA Torture Resolution 10-B, at 
l (adopted Aug. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/torture/torturepolic 
y2004_10B.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (condemning "any use of torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon persons within the 
custody or under the physical control of the United States government ... and any 
endorsement or authorization of such measures by government lawyers."). International law 
can be interpreted to absolutely prohibit interrogation and all forms of abuse. Geneva I, 
supra note 27, at art. 17 (stating that "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion" can be employed); Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36. 
187. See John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and 
Abroad, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 154 (Sanford Levinson, ed., 2004); Waldron, supra 
note 97, at 1727 (the administration was obfuscating "cruel, inhuman and degrading 
methods" from "torture for the purpose of paying lip service to prohibitions"); US Experts 
Unconvinced by Bush Assurance on Torture, REUTERS (June 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0625-07.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(Republican representative Frank Wolf wrote a letter to the Justice Department noting: "I 
am deeply concerned that this memorandum provides legal justification for the US 
government to commit cruel, inhumane and degrading acts, including torture."). 
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combat, occupation, 188 and as general restrictions that prohibit any 
substantial level abuse by government agents in other locations. 189 
With several bodies of law applicable in different contexts and 
locations to prohibit interrogation that would be torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment, another of the Bush Administration's 
approaches was to discount the applicability of generally restrictive 
sources by referencing exceptions in one source. For example, 
specifically to imprison and interrogate detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 
the Administration contended that Articles 1-27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) did not bind U.S. 
actions because the ICCPR was not self-executing as domestic law, 
could not be enforced in American courts, and that the President could 
dismiss restrictions based on exigency. 190 
The ICCPR distinguishes between torture and lesser forms of 
harm and absolutely prohibits torture, but "cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment" could be permitted if there is a sufficient 
188. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 3 (grave breaches of the laws of war include 
"murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; ... outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; [and] the passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment."); Paust, supra note 5, at 835 
(noting that during an occupation, the Geneva Convention and human rights law prohibit 
torture, "'violence,' threat of violence, 'cruel' treatment, 'physical and moral coercion ... to 
obtain information,' 'physical suffering,' 'inhuman' treatment, 'degrading' treatment, 
'humiliating' treatment, and 'intimidation' during interrogation"). 
189. CAT, supra note 68, art. 1 (prohibiting "any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person" for reasons of 
inflicting severe physical or mental pain or punishment, intimidating, inflicting punishment, 
or extracting information); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 6, G.A. 
Res. 43/173, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9, 
1988) (providing that "no person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be 
subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); European 
Convention, supra note 125, art. 3 (defining torture as "any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing 
him ... , or intimidating or coercing him"); Michael John Garcia, The UN. Convention 
Against Torture: Overview of U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens 
1, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, Mar. 11, 2004, available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31351.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting 
that "torture is defined as an extreme form of cruel and unusual punishment committed 
under the color of law" and that the U.S. enacted statutes to enforce Article 3). 
190. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DECADE OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS 45 n.10 
(2011), available at http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/2011-12-
16amr51103201 lenguantanamodecadeofdamage.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
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exigency. 191 The ICCPR is not automatically suspended during a period 
of armed combat, such that combat would be deemed an exigency, 192 
and Article 9 only permits temporary derogations "to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation" and only when member 
states officially request exemptions. 193 Moreover, the ICCPR 
Committee defined torture broadly, such as by noting that sleep 
deprivation, 194 forcing captives into stress positions, hooding, and 
threatening detainees were forms of torture. 195 
The Administration was indeed correct when it reminded that at 
the time of congressional ratification, the ICCPR was not intended to be 
self-executing. 196 However, the Senate made a reservation to the 
ICCPR based on prohibiting torture as standards equivalent to cruel, 
191. Comm. on Int'l Human Rights, The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 42 REC. OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE 
CITY OF N.Y. 235, 240 (1987) (explaining that "most of the obligations imposed by the 
Convention apply only to acts of torture, as defined in Article 1 "); AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 190, at 45 n.10 (stating that the advisory memo "entirely 
ignored the fact that under the ICCPR, even 'in time of public emergency which threatens 
the life of the nation', there can be no derogation from the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (Articles 4 and 7)"). 
192. van Aggelen, supra note I 08, at 56. 
193. ICCPR, supra note 116, at art. 9; Human Rights Comm., CCPR General 
Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency, 72nd Sess., Aug. 31, 
2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.11, 2 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fdlf.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (affirming that 
"[ m ]easures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and 
temporary nature"). 
194. See Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Comm. Against 
Torture, Annual Rep., Sept. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/44; GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 
44, 1257 (Sept. l 0, 1997). 
195. Human Rights Comm., 31st Sess., Oct. 26-Nov. 13, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/43/40, 
2.2, 4, 10 (Oct. 27, 1987), available at 
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/l 987. l 0.27 _Magri_de_ Cariboni_ v _ Uruguay 
.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (being kept incommunicado for 42 days, "blindfolded with 
towelling material," deprived of sleep, beaten, and threatened with torture, was torture); 
Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., July 29, 1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, 8.5 
(July 29, 1997), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/html/114_colombia053.php (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2013) (stating that "being blindfolded and dunked in a canal" and being 
threatened with deadly force were torture). 
196. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992) (specifying that "the 
United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the [ICCPR] are not 
self-executing"); Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 31 I.L.M. 645, 652, 657 
(1992) (stating that "[t]he Administration proposed a declaration stating that Articles l 
through 27 of the [ICCPR] are not self executing" and that "[t]he intent is to clarify that the 
[ICCPR] will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts"). 
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unusual, and inhumane treatment as specified in the Fifth, Eight, and/or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution,197 which means that U.S. 
jurisprudence and law enforcement practices in the U.S. are applicable 
to defining torture and that "the Convention bans conduct that is already 
unconstitutional."198 The White House and Secretary of Defense 
directed the use of psychological interrogation tactics that American 
officials could not engage in inside the U.S. without violating the Eighth 
Amendment and those same standards would be prohibited outside the 
United States when the ICCPR or CAT are applicable to American 
government actions. 199 
3. Endorsing Specific Methods 
With respect to the interrogation tactics that the Bush 
Administration approved, in October 2002, Joint Task Force 170 
furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SOUTHCOM with proposals that 
were substantially similar to interrogation methodology that the CIA 
197. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36, 192 (1990) (the U.S. is bound to prevent '"cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' only insofar as the term ... means the cruel, 
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States"); U.S. DEP'T. OF DEF., 
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON 
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 6 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 
2013) (stating that U.S. obligations "under the Torture Convention apply to the interrogation 
of unlawful combatant detainees," but only to the extent that "cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment and punishment" was restricted under the U.S. Constitution; ICCPR, supra note 
116, art. 7 ("cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" restriction as equated to 
cruel and unusual treatment in the Bill of Rights); Garcia, supra note 189, at 2, 4 (stating 
that police brutality would not be torture under the CAT, but distinguishing from the lesser 
forms of "cruel and unusual punishment" and affirming that both standards are prohibited); 
Id. at 6 (stating that there the Senate restricted "mental torture" to mean "severe physical 
pain and suffering"); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 626 (3d 
ed. 1993) ("The reasons why the United States has maintained its distance from the 
international human rights agreements are not obvious ... [T]here is resistance to accepting 
international standards, and international scrutiny, on matters that have been for the United 
States to decide."). 
198. EVIL, LAW AND THE STATE: PERSPECTIVES ON STATE POWER AND VIOLENCE 9 
(John T. Parry ed., 2006). 
199. Garcia, supra note 189, at 13 (CAT and/or § 2340A restricts torture outside the 
U.S. borders). Congress ensured that this was clear with the McCain Amendment which 
affirms that the President must "take action to ensure" that "[ n ]o individual in the custody or 
under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or 
physical location, shall be subject to cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment and 
punishment prohibited by the U.S. Constitution." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd(d), 2000dd-0(3) 
(2008). 
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researched and incorporated into its Kubark Interrogation Manual in 
1963.200 The Task Force proposed three categories of techniques with 
progressing intensity. Category I authorized interrogators to stimulate 
an uncomfortable environment by yelling and employing deception to 
create stress.201 Category II permitted interrogators to use stress 
positions, produce falsified documents, quarantine captives in solitary 
confinement for up to thirty days, restrict breathing, induce sensory 
deprivation, and invoke phobias. 202 Category III authorized 
interrogators to threaten to kill members of a captive's family, expose 
inmates to harshly cold temperatures and water, engage in daylong 
interrogations, and induce perceptions of drowning or suffocation. 203 In 
December 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approved Category I and 
II, and some methods in Category III. 204 
After some officials contended that detainees frequently resisted 
approved interrogation methods, in early March 2003, a Defense 
Working Group proposed more approaches and Rumsfeld authorized 
another dozen interrogation techniques, including implementing 
"environmental manipulation," altering sleep rhythms from night to 
day, leaving detainees naked in dark isolation for up to thirty days, 
applying harsh heat and cold, withholding food, hooding for several 
days straight, and forcing detainees into "stress positions" that would 
"subject detainees to rising levels of pain."205 Directives progressed 
down the chain of command and interrogators commonly used the 
procedures on detainees at all American detention facilities. 206 
200. Wallach, supra note 56, at 581. 
201. See generally Memorandum from General Counsel of the Department of Defense 
William J. Haynes II for Secretary of Defense (Nov. 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/additional_detainee_documents/ 
07-F-2406%20doc%201.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); Memorandum from Joint Task 
Force 170 for Commander, U.S. Southern Command (Oct. 11, 2002), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) 
[hereinafter Task Force 170]. 
202. Task Force 170, supra note 201, at 1-2. 
203. id. at 2-3. 
204. Wallach, supra note 56, at 583, 593-94; Paust, supra note 5, at 840. In November 
2002, the Bush Administration approved the use of sensory deprivation, stress positions, 
phobias and dogs, psychological trickery, and threat scenarios against the detainee and/or 
his family. Haynes, supra note 201. 
205. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197, at 2, 63-65, 70. 
206. L TG Anthony R. Jones, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 
205th Military intelligence Brigade, FINDLAW.COM 10, 15-16, 25-26 (August 23, 2004), 
available at http:/ !fl 1. findlaw .com/news. findlaw .corn/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt. pdf (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that on September 14, 2003, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, 
authorized the use of twenty-nine interrogation methods in Iraq, including isolation, stress 
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There was emphatic criticism of these methods, which led to 
disagreements with international authorities. The Bush Administration 
offered retorts with a failure to recognize the degree of abuse. For 
example, expressing concerns over the isolation of prisoners, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council stated that the "weight of accumulated 
evidence to date points to the serious and adverse health effects of 
solitary confinement" and that it was a potential breach of the ICC PR. 207 
The Bush Administration denied that "prolonged isolation and 
indefinite detention ... per se constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment."208 Yet with the ICCPR's usual applicability 
to domestic criminal law standards, there is a general distinction 
between placing an already-convicted inmate in solitary confinement 
perhaps for a week as a punishment for misbehaving in a penal facility, 
and capturing a suspected insurgent or terrorist, blindfolding him, taking 
him to an unknown location, and subjecting him to other forms of 
sensory deprivation and isolation for weeks or months without being 
certain about the detainee' s guilt. 
The ECHR deemed methods such as "wall-standing, hooding, 
subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and 
drink," inhuman treatment that caused "at least intense physical and 
mental suffering."209 The methods were explicitly prohibited under the 
ECHR, but they were not deemed torture.210 Legal advisor Jay Bybee 
issued a memo that used the ECHR' s case to develop definitions and 
approved of methods such as sleep deprivation, white noise, stress 
positions, denying food and water, and hooding.211 However, the 
postttons, threats with dogs, and sleep and sensory deprivation, only to revoke the 
authorization several weeks later); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: 
Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT' L L. 309, 340 
(2006) (stating that an approach implemented at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib was to 
use attack dogs to intimidate inmates); Pearlstein, supra note 138, at 1263-65 (Rumsfeld 
approved of using attack dogs and other means of generating fears and individual phobias in 
November 2002); Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 17-31, 60-64 
(discussing abuse at Abu Ghraib); Bejesky, Epiphany Approach, supra note 4, at 6-11 , 20-
25 (discussing abuse at Gitmo). 
207. U.N. Secretary-General, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1177-85, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008). 
208. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 131, at 107. 
209. Paust, supra note 26, at 408-09. 
210. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1706; See also International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11 , Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
211. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1705-06; Jackson Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy, 
Torturing the Rule of Law: USA and the Post 9-11 Legal World, 21 ST. JOHN' S J.L. COMM. 
689, 721 (2007); Seth F. Kreimer, "Torture Lite," "Full Bodied" Torture, and the 
Insulation of Legal Conscience, 1 J. NAT' L SECURITY L. & POL 'y 187, 192 (2005) (noting 
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ECHR case involved British interrogators holding Irish detainees for a 
few days and subjecting them to psychological interrogation methods,212 
while the Bush Administration's orders routinely subjected hundreds of 
detainees to more intense interrogation techniques for many months. 
Nonetheless, shades in the degree of abuse may not have been 
consequential if the most criticized position of all had been taken 
seriously. 
4. Nullifying the Relevance of Authorized Interrogation Standards 
with the Bybee Memo 
Perhaps the most condemned memo,213 approved by Bybee but 
reportedly written by John Yoo in August 2002,214 imparted a legal 
defense for government actors carrying out interrogation directives. 
The Bybee memo stated that for an interrogator to be held criminally 
responsible for abuse, the interrogator must intend that the victim 
"experience intense pain and suffering of the kind that is equivalent to 
the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe 
that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of 
significant bodily function will likely result. "215 Alternatively, federal 
that another advisory position, provided by Judge Advocate L TC Beaver, acknowledged 
that the U.S. was restricted from using methods that would be torture or cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, but maintained that approved interrogation techniques did not violate 
those restrictions; methods such as sleep deprivation, threatening with dogs, inducing 
"misperceptions of asphyxiation," and "mind noninjurious contact" did not violate 
international or domestic law); Charles H. Brower II, The Lives of Animals, the Lives of 
Prisoners, and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353, 1382 
(2004) (interrogators "have used a 110-volt power supply to shock detainees" and 
"performed 'numerous' simulated asphyxiations to obtain information"). 
212. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 405-11. 
213. Koh, supra note 69, at 647 ("[I]n my professional opinion, the Bybee Opinion is 
perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read."); Waldron, supra note 
97, at 1704, 1708 (stating that "[t]he quality of Bybee's legal work here is a disgrace .... 
[T]hese are obvious errors, and the Department of Justice - as the executive department 
charged with special responsibility for the integrity of the legal system."). 
214. Rachael Ward Saltzman, Executive Power and the Office of Legal Counsel, 28 
YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 439, 440 (2010) (stating that it was later reported that Yoo wrote this 
memo and Bybee approved it); Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on 
Presidential Power, WASH. POST (June 25, 2007), available at 
http:/ !blog. washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/pushing_ the_ envelope_ on _presi/ (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (explaining that Yoo kept getting "summoned" to the White House to 
tell CIA officers "what the legal limits of interrogation are" and that administration officials 
"attributed authorship [ of the Bybee memo] to Yoo"). 
215. Bybee, supra note 54, at 1, 3 (stating that "[w]e conclude by examining possible 
defenses that would negate any claim that certain interrogations methods violate the statute" 
and enumerating the high-threshold elements to convict). 
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jurisdiction was established over torture crimes and Section 18 U.S.C. § 
2340A absolutely prohibits physical and psychological torture outside 
the U.S.216 The Torture Statute defines torture as "[a]n act committed 
by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering."217 
The Bybee memo's position that such a malicious mens rea is 
required for a high-level abuse is particularly surprising when federal 
courts have interpreted that specific intent for torture can also exist 
when there is an intentional act that leads to "prolonged mental pain or 
suffering" that is a foreseeable consequence of the deliberate act.218 
Moreover, the Torture Statute is a generally-applicable law that does not 
mention interrogation, but interrogation itself involves a govemment-
sanctioned level of dominance by the interrogator over the captive and 
the relationship is specifically anticipated to employ specific acts to 
inflict harm and make the subject obliging. 
With the Bybee memo's excessively high standard for 
culpability, a government's logical retort to criticism could be that chain 
of command directives could not have authorized illegal orders because 
authorized psychological interrogation tactics were limited and 
interrogators were not convicted of crimes. 219 After all, the legal advice 
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, 2340(1) (2012). There are emerging trends in transnational 
plaintiff litigation. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 
2347 (1991); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 2002 FOR. 
AFFAIRS 102 (2000). 
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012) ("[S]evere mental pain or suffering" defined as 
"prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from . . . the intentional infliction or 
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; the administration or application, 
or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; the threat of imminent death; 
or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain 
or suffering, or the administration or application or mind-altering substances ... "). 
218. Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2004); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 
333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003); see Garcia, supra note 189, at 2 ("[A]n act that results in 
unanticipated and unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture for purposes of the 
Convention."). 
219. Daniel Levin, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Memo 
withdrawing the legal advice on liability and noting that discussion on liability was 
unnecessary because "[ c ]onsideration of the bounds of any such authority would be 
inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive that United States personnel not 
engage in torture."); John T. Parry, "Just for Fun": Understanding Torture and 
Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 253, 267 (2005) ("If the 
Torture Convention is the controlling document, then a state that wishes to justify its 
violence need only assert that, whatever it may have done, it has not tortured. At this point 
the discussion gets bogged down in definitions."); Senate Judiciary Committee Grills 
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states that to be illegal, torture must "inflict pain that is difficult to 
endure," such as pain similar to "death or organ failure," as 
distinguished from cruel and inhuman acts. 220 Most significant to the 
approved interrogation methods is that "[ m ]ental torture" must cause 
"significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for 
months or even years,"221 which would surely be arduous for a detainee-
plaintiff or prosecutor to prove. 
With a substantial gap between definitions prohibiting torture 
under U.S. and international law and the punishment standards 
contained in the Bybee memo, interrogators may have believed that 
their own acts would not be criminally culpable irrespective of the 
Administration's authorized techniques.222 The high threshold criterion 
might also have been further promoted because the Bybee memo 
reiterated that even if there were violations of the U.S. Code, the 
Commander in Chief could still use "flexible" means of interrogation to 
attain information that would prevent terrorist attacks, pursuant to 
"necessity" and "self-defense" justifications.223 
Approved interrogation methods and the President's direction 
for interrogation to remain within U.S. law do not explain how so many 
captives kept emerging with indications that they were severely beaten 
or how as many as two hundred detainees died, with at least 34 
confirmed homicides while in U.S. custody between August 2002 and 
2006.224 In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. military doctors signed many 
Ashcroft on Justice Dept. Memo, PBS (June 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/govemment_programs/jan-june04/torture _ 6-8.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (In responding to the scandal following the Abu Ghraib atrocities, 
Rumsfeld remarked: "Let me completely reject the notion that anything that this President 
has done or the Justice Department has done has directly resulted in the kind of atrocity 
which were cited ... There is no Presidential order immunizing torture."). 
220. Bybee, supra note 54, at I. 
221. Id. at 7. 
222. For example, the Bush Administration's interrogation standards did not approve 
of organ failure and death as pressure tactics to gain information, but the same agency of 
government - the Justice Department - is the same agency that is empowered to decide 
whether to criminally prosecute. Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. 
Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, NY TIMES (Oct. 4, 2007), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007 I I 0/04/washington/04interrogate.html?pagewanted=all& _r=O 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
223. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31, 39-45. 
224. Command's Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in U.S. Custody in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Feb. l, 2006), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/up loads/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-rep-web. pdf 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 390, 398-99, 406 (placing the 
death toll caused by interrogation practices at 200 detainees through 2006); Stephen N. 
Xenakis, More on: "Doctors Must Be Healers", 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 703, 706 (2007) (at 
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detainee death certificates with causes that were tantamount to 
torture, 225 but interrogators were not being prosecuted226 even though 
torture and acts of cruel and unusual punishment require punishment 
under international law.227 Is it possible that legal advice regarding the 
mens rea of interrogators undermined the reasonable application of 
approved interrogation standards and that the legal advice was 
incompatible with the definition of a criminally punishable act under 
international and domestic law? 
Given the definition in U.S. federal law, many scholars and 
government and military lawyers expressed that the memo mangled the 
definitions of torture and culpability for torture,228 provided a 
"breathtakingly expansive view of presidential powers," was 
inconsistent withjus cogens norms,229 and endorsed criminal conduct. 230 
least 98 detainees died in U.S. custody, and Physicians for Human Rights tallied 105 deaths 
in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005); James W. Smith III, A Few Good 
Scapegoats: The Abu Ghrabi Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military Justice System, 
27 WHITTIER L. REv. 671, 675 (2006) (noting that the British also engaged in torture of 
detainees that resulted in deaths); Report: 108 Die in U.S. Custody, CBS NEWS (Mar. 16, 
2005), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/ l 6/terror/main680658.shtml 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that based on information supplied by the Army, Navy 
and other government agencies, at least 108 detainees died in U.S. custody). 
225. Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 402-03, 406. 
226. Khan, supra note 20, at 8 (stating that despite this evidence of deaths during 
interrogation, "not one single CIA personnel has been prosecuted"). By comparison, in the 
rare case of prosecution during the Vietnam War, the military court held that "whether 
Lieutenant Calley was the most ignorant person in the United States Army in Vietnam or the 
most intelligent, he must be presumed to know that he could not kill the people involved 
here." U.S. v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 544 (C.M.A. 1973). 
227. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36. 
228. Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts on 
Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1407, 1418 (2008). 
229. David A. Wallace, Torture v. The Basic Principles of the U.S. Military, J. INT'L 
CRIM. JUST. (May 2008), available at http://jicj.oxfordjoumals.org/content/6/2/309.full.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on 
Federal Courts, The Indefinite Detention of "Enemy Combatants": Balancing Due Process 
and National Security in the Context of the War on Terror, RECORD (2004), available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/1C_ WL06!.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting the "almost 
unlimited expansion of executive power" specifically because "the domestic war on terror" 
was treated as the same as "'total war' circumstances of World War II and the Civil War"); 
IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 105 (former Nixon Counsel John Dean 
stating that the Bybee "Torture Memo" is "damning evidence suggesting a common plan [ or 
conspiracy] on the part of the Administration to violate the laws of war"); Jordan J. Paust, 
Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading 
Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (2009) 
("[M]emoranda ... facilitated the common, unifying plan devised by an inner circle to use 
torture."). If Dean is correct, the memo could implicate top officials as conspirators in 
deaths and abuse that resulted after the order's issuance date. Id.; United States v. Laster, 42 
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Explaining precisely what transpired, Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell 
explains that the authors of the memo ignored "the negotiating history 
of the treaty" and "went to a completely unrelated document, a health 
care statute, found a provision that they liked, and from this statute they 
constructed a definition of torture that limited torture to actions 
inflicting the pain of 'organ failure or death. "'231 
Even John Yoo conceded that the memorandum does not 
represent "majority views among international law academics,"232 but a 
former White House lawyer believed the memo's perspective was more 
strained than a minority opinion and estimated that "if you line up 1,000 
law professors, only six or seven would sign up to [ the torture memo's 
viewpoint]."233 In a June 2004 press conference, Gonzales contended 
that there were "unnecessary, over-broad discussions in some of these 
memos that address abstract legal theories, or discussions subject to 
misinterpretation, but [those opinions were] not relied upon by decision-
makers are under review, and may be replaced, if appropriate, with 
more concrete guidance."234 If this is true and the torture memo was a 
M.J. 538, 540 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (noting that under military law, circumstantial 
evidence can provide the basis to infer that there was an agreement to commit a crime 
between two parties). 
230. Wallace, supra note 229, at 313 (calling the string of memos "overly legalistic 
and patently erroneous attempts to redefine torture"); Peter Brooks, The Plain Meaning of 
Torture?, SLATE (Feb. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news _and _politics/jurisprudence/2005/02/the _plain_ meaning 
_of_torture.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (calling the opinion "the work of some bizarre 
literary deconstructionist"); Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 
15, 2004), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17230 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(stating that the memo is equivalent to "the advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how 
to skirt the law and stay out of prison"). 
231. O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5136. 
232. R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memorandums, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 5, 2004, at A4 (quoting John Yoo). 
233. John Hagan, Gabrielle Ferrales & Guillermina Jasso, How Law Rules: Torture, 
Terror, and the Normative Judgments of Iraqi Judges, 42 LAW & Soc'y REV. 605, 610 
(2008); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture: Prophecy and 
Casuistry: Abortion, Torture and Moral Discourse, 51 VILL. L. REV. 499, 530 (2006) 
(noting that a percentage of Catholics repudiated Bush for using specious reasons to wage 
war against Iraq and that revelations of torture and memos justifying torture called into 
question Bush's commitment to human dignity). 
234. Press Briefing by White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, et al., WHITE HOUSE 
(Sept. 25, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040622-14.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2013); Edward Alden, Top Lawyers Call Legal OK for Torture 'Preposterous', FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 2004), available at http://archive.truthout.org/article/top-lawyers-call-legal-ok-
torture-preposterous (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) ( stating that Yoo referred to the opinion as 
"an abstract analysis of the meaning of a treaty and a statute."). 
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response to a policymaker request, it makes one wonder how many of 
the other advisory memos were intended to be planks of initial 
cogitation. 
Perhaps it was partially the glut of warnings of abuse235 and 
appalling victim accounts that puzzled Senators when Gonzales testified 
before the Senate in January 2005 and when he explained emphatically 
that the Bybee memo had been withdrawn and that he and Bush had 
both repudiated torture. 236 Senator Kennedy retorted by remarking that 
"for a two-year period when it was in effect, you didn't object to it."237 
In fact, it took until June 2005 for the U.S. government to even admit 
that prisoners had been subjected to abuse amounting to torture in 
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan.238 By this point, the Bush 
Administration had already renamed the interrogation approaches and 
tweaked the standards. 
5. Modifying the Bybee Memo and Using "Enhanced 
Interrogation " 
In December 2004, Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin, 
wrote a memo that withdrew the language of the Bybee memo, written 
over two years earlier, that required pain equivalent to "organ failure, 
impairment of bodily functions, or even death."239 The new memo 
stated that to meet the definition of punishable torture, physical harm 
must be severe in "intensity and duration or persistence" and more than 
"mild and transitory pain," and that "mental harm must be of some 
lasting duration," but the harm need not last for "months or years."240 
235. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 19-22 ( explaining that the 
Bush Administration had been warned about illegalities in American prison facilities long 
before the memo was reportedly rejected). 
236. Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2005), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01 /06/politics/06TEXT-
GONZALES.html? _r=O&pagewanted=all&position= (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Gonzales 
stating, after being questioned over whether he agreed with the interpretation of the standard 
for torture in the Bybee memo, "I do not [ agree with that interpretation]. That does not 
represent the position of the executive branch."). 
237. Id. 
238. US Acknowledges Torture at Guantanamo; in Iraq, Afghanistan UN, AFX 
NEWS LIMITED (Sept. 25, 2005), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060207165 83 6/http://www.forbes.com/work/feeds/ afx/2005/0 
6/24/afx2110388.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) (UN Committee member stating: "They are 
no longer trying to duck this and have respected their obligation to inform the UN."). 
239. Levin, supra note 219. 
240. Id. ( calling the torture memo "abhorrent both to American law and values and to 
international norms" and that there may be questions of whether an interrogator 
"specifically intended" to engage in an act of torture "in light of the President's directive 
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Citing a Supreme Court case to address interrogator culpability, the 
revised OLC memo stated that if an interrogator "acted in good faith, 
and only after reasonable investigation establishing that his conduct 
would not inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, it appears 
unlikely that he would have the specific intent necessary of violate 
sections 2340-2340A."241 
Professor Jack Goldsmith replaced Bybee as head of the OLC in 
2003 and rescinded many of the opinions242 and called Yoo' s work from 
200 I to 2003 "deeply flawed: sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and 
incautious in asserting extraordinary constitutional authorities on behalf 
of the President. "243 Goldsmith was "anointed as a hero by the media" 
for repealing the memos,244 but Goldsmith had also been known to 
represent an ideological position that preferred to treat international law 
as discretionary norms,245 and his 2004 OLC memo added a footnote 
stating that "all the interrogation methods that earlier opinions had 
found legal were still legal."246 The footnote arguably nullified the 
relevance of the new memo and John Yoo apparently believed that 
Goldsmith's withdrawal of the opinion was merely "'for appearances' 
sake to divert public criticism in the immediate aftermath of the Abu 
Ghraib controversy. 'In the real world of interrogation policy nothing 
had changed. "'247 
that the United States not engage in torture"). 
241. Id. 
242. Saltzman, supra note 214, at 446. 
243. Dan Eggen & Peter Baker, New Book Details Cheney Lawyer's Efforts to Expand 
Executive Power, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007 /09/04/ AR2007090402292.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); JACK 
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMfNISTRATION 146-50 (W.W. Norton & Company 2007); Yamamoto, supra note 66, at 
318-19 ( citing lists of other legal authorities). 
244. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349. 
245. Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights 
Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 421 (2006) (critiquing Posner and Goldsmith's realist 
ideological book and stating that "[t]he book cannot be viewed as separate from the authors' 
broader normative project - a project that seeks to minimize U.S. participation in U.S. 
institutions and to limit the application of the international law," and noting Goldsmith's 
realist ideological affinity with other advisors). 
246. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349 (citing Yoo, supra note 38, at 183); GOLDSMITH, 
supra note 243, at 155-56; Power, supra note 15, at 97-98 (stating that Goldsmith was 
entirely supportive of the Bush Administration, but partially cleaned the mess left by 
anteceding memos). 
247. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349 (citing Yoo, supra note 38, at 183). 
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It does appear that nothing had changed. In February 2005, 
shortly after Alberto Gonzales became Attorney General and about one 
month after Levin's memo was produced, Gonzales endorsed methods 
that were reportedly "the harshest interrogation techniques ever used by 
the Central Intelligence Agency. "248 Other than waterboarding, the new 
methods that authorized degrees of physical touching could probably 
already be presumed to be occurring and many methods were the same 
as or substantially similar to the techniques approved in 2002, but they 
were now labeled "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques."249 Only the 
label was changed on methods that were already called torture. 25° For 
example, JAG attorneys, the international community, and U.S. courts 
have called waterboarding torture,251 but CIA Director Porter Goss 
248. Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 222; R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, 
Gonzales Helped Set the Course for Detainees, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A48446-2005Jan4.html (last visited Nov. 
19, 2013) (noting that Gonzales had intricate involvement because he chaired meetings with 
top government officials that detailed "how much pain and suffering a US intelligence 
officer could inflict on a prisoner without violating" U.S. criminal law and that approved 
methods included "'waterboarding,' a tactic intended to make detainees feel as if they are 
drowning" and the "threat of live burial"). 
249. These "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" included grabbing and slapping 
prisoners, shaking them to get their attention, imposing long-time standing, placing 
detainees in "cold cells," and using "waterboarding." Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA 's 
Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2005), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/lnvestigation/story?id=1322866 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013); 
See supra Parts IIl(F)(3)(4). 
250. Resnick, supra note 10, at 614 ( explaining that "[t]he labels 'enhanced 
interrogation,' 'harsh' techniques, and 'coercion' have been offered up in lieu of the words 
torture, and the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" to define detainment conditions); 
Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 393 (calling the memos "permissible interrogation techniques" 
was just "a euphemism for torture"); Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk & Tiphanie Crittin, The 
Obama Administration and Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (2011) (noting that the memos were ostensibly 
endeavoring to further justify the system of extraordinary rendition flights and secret CIA 
detention facilities). 
251. Scott Horton, The JAGs Set the Record Straight, HARPER'S (Nov. 4, 2007), 
available at http://harpers.org/archive/2007/11/hbc-90001588 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(noting that JAG attorneys "unanimously and unambiguously agreed that [waterboarding is] 
inhumane and illegal and would constitute a violation of international law, to include 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions."); Martin Hodgson, US Censored for 
Waterboarding, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/07/humanrights.usa (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak remarking, "I'm not willing any more 
to discuss these questions with the U.S. government, when they say [waterboarding] is 
allowed. It's not allowed."). After World War II, the U.S. prosecuted Japanese officials for 
using waterboarding and U.S. courts have customarily classified waterboarding as a form of 
torture. Power, supra note 15, at 85; Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History 
of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468, 472-99 (2007); Jordan J. 
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explained that waterboarding is "an area of what I call professional 
interrogation techniques. "252 Against the order of Congress, the CIA 
destroyed the interrogation tapes of detainees who were subject to 
waterboarding. 253 
Even after all of the criticism and challenges to the standards, 
methods approved, and culpability level for interrogation, the President 
continued to pronounce discretion under the Commander in Chief 
power254 and contended that the CIA had authority to choose 
interrogation methods. 255 In summer 2007, the Justice Department 
issued "letters," instead of "advisory memos," and noted that the Bush 
Administration was retaining flexibility in permitting the CIA' s 
"harsher interrogation techniques. "256 Instead of addressing torture and 
Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1535, 1553 (2009) (water-boarding "manifestly and unavoidably 
constitute[s] torture"). 
252. Douglas Jehl, Questions Left by C.I.A. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
18, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/world/20detain.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that the CIA subjected Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abu 
Zubaydah to waterboarding for a combined total of 266 sessions); Dan Eggen, Justice 
Official Defends Rough CIA Interrogations: Severe, Lasting Pain is Torture, He Says, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2008, at A3 (reporting that OLC advisor Steven G. Bradbury 
explained to a House subcommittee that "if it doesn't involve severe physical pain, and it 
doesn't last very long, it may not constitute severe physical suffering" and noting that 
waterboarding is not torture). Republican candidate Rudy Giuliani stated that whether 
waterboarding is legal "depends on how it's done. It depends on the circumstances. It 
depends on who does it." Michael Cooper, In His Words: Giuliani on Torture, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007110/25/in-his-own-
words-giuliani-on-torture/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
253. Scott Shane, Prosecutor to Review Official Handling of C.J.A . Tapes, N. Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 10, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.corn/2008/02/10/us/1 Otapes.html? _r=O 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
254. Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 4, 
2006), available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/01 /04/bush _could_ bypass_ new_ torture_ b 
an/?page=full (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (reporting that after Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act (OTA) to prohibit torture of detainees, Bush included a "signing statement," 
asserting that he had the prerogative to bypass the law as commander in chief). The signing 
statement should have no legal effect because Congress defines the expanse of the 
Commander in Chief authority. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 28-33, 89-93. 
255. Exec. Order No. 13440 (July 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-l 3440.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (reaffirming 
that the Geneva Convention did not apply to "al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces" 
and that the CIA was authorized to engage in "certain detention and interrogations" that are 
not torture or cruel and inhumane treatment, with the "conditions of confinement and 
interrogation practices" determined by the CIA). 
256. Mark Mazzetti, Letters Give C.I.A. Tactics a Legal Rationale, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
27, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27 /washington/27intel.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
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cruel and inhumane treatment, the "letter" distracted attention onto a 
new and lesser category of offense by noting that there would be no 
violation of the Geneva Convention's prohibitions of "outrages upon 
personal dignity" as long as interrogation procedures did not intend to 
humiliate, there was a need to defend the U.S., or if the act of 
humiliation was not "so deplorable that the reasonable observer would 
recognize it as something that should be universally condemned. "257 
In a peculiar interpretation of what transpired, Goldsmith wrote 
in his book that the Bush Administration experienced a failed attempt at 
presidential expansionism, was "strangled by law," and did not 
sufficiently rely on "soft power" persuasion to attain consent for its 
policies.258 The Bush Administration did not appear to be "strangled by 
law" to implement interrogation initiatives because as new human rights 
abuses were reported, new standards were devised, time passed, and 
more loopholes opened based on discretionary circumstances and 
actions hidden in national security secrecy. 
With respect to laws that prohibit wars of aggression and the use 
of rhetoric to persuade, Bush readily issued unsubstantiated terror threat 
announcements to the American public to drive fear rhetoric259 and top 
Bush Administration officials made at least 935 patently false 
statements and hundreds of other misleading statements on 532 different 
occasions about weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda to 
persuade Americans that Iraq was a security threat and needed to be 
invaded.260 Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard Professor Linda 
Bilmes estimated that the war in Iraq cost the American public upwards 
of $3 trillion when including indirect expenditures, and Bush departed 
from office with the lowest recorded American Presidential approval 
ratings in history at 22%, which was due to the Iraq war and poor 
economic conditions.261 Not being restrained by law and implementing 
persuasive tactics without consequence were substantially due to misuse 
of the secrecy prerogatives of the national security apparatus. 
257. Id. 
258. GOLDSMITH, supra note 243, at 69, 205-16. 
259. Bejesky, Rational Choice Reflection, supra note 3, at 37-48; Bejesky, CFP, supra 
note 110, at 20-24. 
260. Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 343, 348-49 (2012). 
261. Robert Bejesky, Political Penumbras of Taxes and War Powers for the 2012 
Election, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 1-3 (2012). 
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IV. A POLITICIZED ROLE WITH SECRECY 
A. The Secrecy Pipeline 
As public revelations of human rights abuses and public 
excoriation periodically emerged, generally from whistleblower 
accounts or investigations, the Bush Administration delayed thorough 
investigations by unilaterally choosing to hide legal advice under 
national security by designating legal advice, orders for interrogation, 
and execution of directives as pieces of encompassing covert 
operation;262 diluted responsibility by timely declassifying memos to 
defend that previously issued interrogation directives were legal; and 
then modified standards and definitions so they could continue virtually 
the same operations. The Geneva Conventions and criminal law 
prohibitions against torture and interrogation were unilaterally 
dismissed with classified legal advice263 and successions of wrongs 
passed without accountability being imposed and with the Bush 
Administration only experiencing minimal and temporary political 
fallout. 
It is true that the lawyers in the Attorney General's Office can 
have multiple roles because they must enforce the law and defend the 
U.S. government when there is a case or controversy, but the zealous 
262. ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL, 24 (News Press, 1st ed. 
2006) (stating that the Justice Department memos and Presidential orders authorized 
obscene powers to intelligence and military agents to detain and interrogation and that 
memos were eventually declassified); Pearlstein, supra note 138, at 1273 (stating that 
"Congress was largely absent from engagement in U.S. policies of detention and 
interrogation from 2001 through much of 2005 ."); Transcript: Reps. Harman, Hoekstra on 
'FNS ', Fox NEWS (Dec. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007 I 12/ 16/transcript-reps-harman-hoekstra-on-fns/ (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Congresswoman Jane Harman noting: "We have a system of checks 
and balances and it's broken. We're in Constitutional crisis because of the arrogant view of 
some in this administration that they can decide what the policy is, write the legal opinions 
to justify that policy and be accountable to no one."). The use of Extraordinary Rendition 
provides a good example. Kreimer, supra note 31, at 1189-90; Louis Henkin, A Decent 
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 231 (1992) 
("abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and ... 
the territorial integrity of another state"); Lila Rajiva, The CIA 's Rendition Flights to Secret 
Prisons: The Torture-Go-Round, COUNTERPUNCH (Dec. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.counterpunch.org/rajiva12052005.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (stating that 
there was significant evidence supporting a "long line of renditions without cause/due 
process of any kind" and that the Bush Administration was falsely representing that nothing 
illegal was occurring). 
263. John J. Gibbons, Commentary on the Terror on Trial Symposium, 28 Rev. LITIG. 
297, 300-01 (2008). 
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advocate 1s not the proper role for legal advisors who provide 
consultation for policy development. Recall that the White House 
specifically requested advisors to provide ways to "exercise the full 
panoply of powers granted the president by Congress and the 
Constitution" and stated that he did not care if that meant "pushing the 
boundaries of the law."264 Advisors did push the boundaries of the law 
and commentators have called the legal advice despicable, 
professionally unethical,265 in violation of non-derogative international 
law,266 and even criminal.267 Condemnations followed after policies 
were executed due to the use of the national security apparatus. 
264. Thomas, supra note 11; Neil M. Peretz, The Limits of Outsourcing: Ethnical 
Responsibilities of Federal Government Attorneys Advising Executive Branch Officials, 6 
CONN. Pub. INT. L. J. 23, 23-24 (2006) (stating that there is the possibility that legal advisors 
could issue opinions to curry favor with bosses). 
265. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1687 (emphasizing that it is unfortunate that "views 
and proposals like these should be voiced by scholars who have devoted their lives to the 
law, to the study of the rule of law, and to the education of future generations of lawyers is a 
matter of dishonor for our profession"); Saltzman, supra note 214, at 440-41 (reporting that 
after the change in Administration, the Justice Department's Office of Professional 
Responsibility and other authorities recommended that the authors of the memos should be 
referred to proper disciplinary authorities); Power, supra note 15, at 41 ("Law drove policy 
decisions throughout the war, and not always in good or morally justifiable ways."). 
266. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 386-92 (discussing how 
advisory memos were inconsistent with prohibitions on torture); Jesselyn Radack, Tortured 
Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 COLO. L. 
REV. 1, 24 (2006) ("The acts endorsed by the torture memoranda violate a jus cogens norm 
of international law by advocating and excusing acts of torture."); Waldron, supra note 97, 
at 1681 (noting that the torture memoranda subvert the rule of law); Paust, supra note 5, at 
861-62 ("As various memoranda, authorizations and actions noted above demonstrate, there 
were plans to deny protections under the Geneva Conventions ... The plans to deny 
protections ... violate the [Geneva] Conventions, and violations of the Conventions are war 
crimes."). 
267. Koh, supra note 69, at 654 ("if a client asks a lawyer how to break the law and 
escape liability, a good lawyer should not say, 'here's how.' The lawyer's ethical duty is to 
say no."); Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 347, 
349, 357, 362-63 (2007) ("lawyers are potentially complicit in war crimes when they 
'materially contribute' to the commission of crimes like torture," including via the 
International Criminal Court or under the Convention Against Torture); Scott Higham, Law 
Experts Condemn U.S. Memos on Torture, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A4 l l 89-2004Aug4.html (last visited Nov. 
19, 2013) (quoting John J. Gibbons, former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals) ("The position taken by the government lawyers [ within the Bush Administration] 
in these legal memoranda amount to counseling a client as to how to get away with violating 
a law."). 
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B. Using Secrecy to Hide Illegal Orders 
One of the first of the later condemned directives was issued 
shortly after 9/11 by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who launched a 
"special-access program" to assassinate or capture and interrogate "high 
value targets. "268 International law prohibits assassinations and an 
executive order has long banned American government officials from 
ordering assassinations, but Bush explained that he was not waiving the 
executive order, but instead killing "enemy combatants."269 The Bush 
Administration tasked the CIA with abducting suspected terrorists and 
conducting hundreds of covert flights across the world to deliver 
prisoners to secret detention centers and other countries with 
Extraordinary Rendition.270 Secret prisons prima facie violate the 
Geneva Conventions and International Committee of the Red Cross 
inspection requirements,271 but Bush did not officially acknowledge the 
secret detention centers until September 2006.272 International law 
forbids abductions and rendering individuals to countries when it is 
268. Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program Came to 
Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER (May 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/24/040524 fa_ fact?currentPage=all (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2013); Seymour M. Hersh, Rumsfeld's Dirty War on Terror, GUARDIAN HOUSE 
(Sept. 13, 2004), available at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6898.htm 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (describing abductions and noting that they had been occurring 
from 2001 to 2004). Secrecy was manifest because the only individuals privy to the 
operations were a few top Bush Administration officials and about two hundred Navy 
SEALs and Army Delta Force who were to execute operations in elite squads. Noted in 
McCOY, supra note 49, at 116-17; Adeno Addis, The "War on Terror" as an Autoimmunity 
Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 323, 339 (2007); GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP 88 (Metro. 
Books, 2006) (stating that there were reports of the U.S. aiding paramilitary groups 
"accused of assassinations and torture" and that a former high-level intelligence agent 
explained that locals were being recruited in the same way that the Reagan Administration 
founded and financed "right-wing execution squads in El Salvador"). 
269. James Risen & David Johnston, Threats and Responses: Hunt for al Qaeda; Bush 
has Widened Authority of Cl.A. to Kill Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2002), available at 
http://www.nytimes.corn/2002/ 12/ 15/world/threats-responses-hunt-for-al-qaeda-bush-has-
widened-authori ty-cia-kil l.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Brian Whitaker & Oliver 
Burkeman, Killing Probes the Frontiers of Robotics and Legality, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 
2002), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/06/usa.alqaida (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2013) (reporting that Anna Lindh, the Swedish foreign minister, called such 
assassinations "a summary execution that violates human rights"). 
270. McCOY, supra note 49, at 116-17; Bejesky, Sensibly Construing, supra note 135, 
at 1-3, 6-10. 
271. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 75; Symposium, Left Out in the 
Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America, 57 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2008); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 
AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1450 (2008). 
272. Khan, supra note 20, at 6-7. 
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expected that the detainee will be tortured, and Congress must approve 
of rendition programs.273 Orders to engage in abusive interrogations 
began secretly and from the beginning, it seemed that the assumption 
was that lawmakers and the public had no right to know. 274 
CIA Director Tenet reportedly went to the White House to attain 
approval to permit minute details of interrogation to protect agents from 
criminal prosecution275 and Bush purportedly exempted the CIA from 
military rules on interrogation after 9/11 under the rationale that 
"certain terrorists might have information that might save American 
lives" and even noted that criminal law restrictions could be avoided in 
specific circumstances.276 The problem with the requests and assumed 
legitimacy of exemptions is that the President does not have the 
authority to grant another government agency the right to violate 
criminal law or human rights law, particularly if methods approved rise 
to the level of torture or a jus co gens violation, or the right to exempt an 
agency from international laws that are binding inside a war zone, 277 
which is also unrelated to protecting American civilians from terrorist 
attacks. 
After operations were executed, secrecy undermined criminal 
justice processes in the two high-profile and rare prosecutions. In 2006, 
CIA contract employee David A. Passaro was convicted of assault for 
the death of Afghan detainee Abdul W ali in June 2003. 278 At the 
beginning of the trial, Passaro sought to introduce classified memos and 
emails and to subpoena CIA officials to prove that CIA superiors 
directed and approved of abusive practices, but the judge denied his 
273. Bejesky, Sensibly Construing, supra note 135, at 10-12. 
274. ARNOVE, supra note 262, at 26 (testifying before a joint House and Senate 
intelligence committee hearing, Cofer Black, the head of the CIA's Counterterrorism 
Center, claimed that "operational flexibility" was needed in dealing with suspected terrorists 
and stated: "This is a very highly classified area, but I have to say that all you need to know: 
There was a before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11 ... After 9/11 the gloves come off."); 
CIA Interrogation Techniques: What Did Congress Know, CNN, (Dec. 13, 2007), available 
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0712/13/ltm.02.html (last visited on Nov. 19, 
2013) (stating that sometime in 2002, four Congresspersons on the SSCI were the first to be 
informed that the CIA would be engaging in an operation involving harsh interrogation 
methods to attain information from captives). 
275. Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 45 
(2008). 
276. Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 236. 
277. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36; See supra Part II. 
278. Gregory P. Bailey, Note, United States v. Passaro: Exercising Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Over Non-Defense Department Government Contractors Committing Crimes 
Overseas Under the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States, 58 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1143, 1157-59 (2009). 
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request in a closed hearing on the basis of protecting state secrets.279 
Passaro claimed that the Bush Administration was classifying 
everything, and that the judge did not know any better than to deny 
requests to documents that the Bush Administration classified, which 
included decisive evidence.280 Likewise, Corporal Charles Graner was 
convicted for his role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, and Graner appealed 
on the basis that there was an order for a "suspension" of war crime 
laws for the American military,281 which does not seem illogical with 
today's knowledge of the loophole legal opinions that were issued by 
advisors. 282 
The state secrets doctrine has questionable legitimacy,283 
particularly when government directives were implemented and there 
are questions of fact over whether those orders led to detainee deaths 
and severe abuse, but pertinent government documents are classified 
and treated as "secret" information. The state secrets privilege is a 
common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to "block 
discovery in a lawsuit of any information that, if disclosed, would 
adversely affect national security, "284 but it should not routinely prevail 
over a criminal defendant's assertion to obtain classified materials 
unless the classified document's evidentiary value to the accused is 
"clearly negligible."285 Nonetheless, both Passaro and Granier defended 
279. Ryan P. Logan, Note, The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005: Embodying U.S. 
Values to Eliminate Detainee Abuse by Civilian Contractors and Bounty Hunters in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1605, 1635 (2006); Judge Denies Ex-CIA 
Contractor Access to Classified Documents, WRAL.COM (Aug. 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1091970/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
280. Logan, supra note 279, at 1633-34. 
281. Dan Eggen & Josh White, Administration Asserted a Terror Exception on Search 
and Seizure, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/03/ AR2008040304 l 36.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
282. Scott Horton, A Nuremberg Lesson, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2005), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/20/opinion/oe-horton20 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(Gonzales stating that "the Geneva Convention was 'obsolete' when it came to the war on 
terror."). Abu Ghraib was in Iraq, but the directives that were issued for Iraq also did not 
effectively respect the Geneva Conventions. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 
19, at 22-31. 
283. LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006); Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and 
Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1933 (2007) (contending that the state 
secret' s doctrine weakens congressional and judicial oversight of the executive). 
284. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Reynolds v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the 
National Security or Immunity for the Executive, 91 YALE L.J. 570 (1982). 
285. United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (citing 
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938)). 
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by contending that they were acting on orders of superiors and both 
claims were rejected, with Passaro' s claim being rejected specifically 
because the memos he wanted to introduce as evidence were classified 
and protected from disclosure under "national security. "286 By April 
2008, 22 out of 24 civil cases of alleged abuse by civilian employees 
and contractors were dropped by the Justice Department, and they may 
have been dropped substantially due to the defenses advanced by legal 
advisors. 287 It appears that advisory memos were classified to protect 
the administration and diffuse attention from scandal. 
C. Using Secrecy to Hide Legal Advice 
Over two years after the invasion of Afghanistan, classified 
legal advisory memos periodically emerged. 288 The Justice Department 
Office of Professional Responsibility later investigated and provided a 
rather astounding explanation, which was that there were very few 
recipients of the legal memoranda because of "the limited number of 
security clearances granted to review the materials," that "[t]his denial 
of clearances to individuals who routinely handle highly classified 
materials has never been explained satisfactorily," and that the denial 
"represented a departure from OLC's traditional practices of widely 
circulating drafts of important opinions for comment. "289 Professor 
Jack Goldsmith, the new head of the OLC after Bybee, acknowledged 
the secrecy and "limited readership" and stated that other departments, 
such as the State Department, were expected to object to the opinions.290 
For example, when pressed about specific legal device, 
Gonzales explained that he renounced advice imparted in one of the 
memos and would review other opinions issued by the OLC (or "John 
Yoo"), but also mentioned that the document in question was not 
scheduled to be declassified until 2012.291 Another memo written by 
286. United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 220 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that the trial 
court "admitted some of the evidence in full, admitted some in redacted form, and excluded 
some as irrelevant, cumulative, or corroborative," which was not an abuse of discretion). 
287. Eggen & White, supra note 281, at A04. 
288. Michael Isikoff, Double Standards?, NEWSWEEK (May 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard. php?az=view _ all&address= 103x5 
2175 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
289. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 260. 
290. GOLDSMITH, supra note 243, at 167; Neil Kinkopf, Is it Better to be Loved or 
Feared? Some Thoughts on Lessons Learned From the Presidency of George W. Bush, 4 
DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. PoL'Y 45, 46 (2009) (stating that "Administration officials 
deliberated only among themselves: not publicly and not with Congress"). 
291. Allen & Schmidt, supra note 57, at AO 1. 
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Yoo and dated March 14, 2003 was eighty-one pages and not 
declassified until March 31, 2008.292 In July 2011, Human Rights 
Watch noted that top officials should be investigated and prosecuted if 
evidence warrants it, but pointed out that a main impediment to 
gathering evidence is that much information, internal memoranda, 
directives, and advisory memos remained classified. 293 
With respect to the details of the authorized interrogation methods, 
Gonzales contended in written responses for his confirmation hearings 
for Attorney General that he could not reveal "exceptional" Top Secret 
interrogation standards or practices because disclosure "would fairly 
rapidly provide al-Qaeda with a road map concerning the interrogation 
that captured terrorists can expect to face and would enable al-Qaeda to 
improve its counter-interrogation training to match it."294 This was not 
a very compelling explanation because the general methods of 
interrogation had been known for decades and were denounced by the 
international community. 295 
Despite the fact that Bush and other top officials kept issuing 
orders for interrogation consistent with the legal advice, 296 classifying 
memoranda, and facing criticism by claiming that interrogators were 
ordered to remain within U.S. law, Gonzales oddly explained: "I don't 
believe the President had access to any legal opinions from the 
292. See van Aggelen, supra note 108 (referencing Memorandum from John Yoo, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel 
of the Dep't of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003). 
293. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 2; Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, 
Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17 /us/politics/17detain.html? _r=O (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (announcing the release of four new "detailed memos describing 
brutal interrogation techniques"). Recent investigations assessed the professional and ethical 
conduct of the lawyers as licensed attorneys, but Yoo's attorneys responded that the State 
Bar of Pennsylvania, his state of licensure, has a four-year statute of limitations for the 
advice in question, which had already expired. Miguel A. Estrada of Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher LLP, Response to the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Professional 
Responsibility Final Report, at 4 (July 29, 2009), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20100220JUSTICE/20100220JUSTICE-
Y ooResponse.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
294. Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Says '02 Policy on Detainees Doesn't Bind CIA, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.nytimes,com/2005/01 I 19/politics/ 19gonzales.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
295. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 405-11 (explaining that the 
details of the CIA's Kubark interrogation manual (1963) could have been downloaded from 
the Internet, the methods were in findings and holdings of the ECHR case involving British 
abuse of Irish detainees in Northern Ireland, and waterboarding had been known of and 
condemned as war crimes since World War 11.); see supra Part III(F)(3)(5). 
296. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 22-30. 
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Department of Justice. "297How could Bush and appointees possibly 
issue orders and publicly claim that those tasked with carrying out 
directives were not violating law if he was not privy to the content of 
the memos?298 The directives that were issued were considered illegal 
and unconstitutional to an overwhelming percentage of Americans, the 
legal profession, and the rest of the world, 299 but the White House hid 
behind the advice of four attorneys who kept issuing opinions to each 
other, and top Bush Administration officials kept classifying the 
memos. These top officials hid behind select legal memos in the same 
manner that they hid behind "intelligence information" to make their 
claims to invade Iraq.300 The secrecy also caused chagrin for the U.S. 
military. 
D. Using Secrecy that Compromised Military Responsibilities 
The legal advice from Bush Administration lawyers placed the 
military in a precarious situation because military officials were also 
implementing directives and managing detention facilities, but military 
officials and attorneys were either substantially unaware of the legal 
advice that sanctioned levels of abuse or their objections were 
ignored.301 The Schlesinger Report, which studied interrogation and 
297. Adam Liptak, Author of '02 Memo on Torture: Gentle Soul for a Harsh Topic, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/world/reach-
war-legal-advice-author-02-memo-torture-gentle-soul-for-harsh-
topic.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
298. Steven R. Weisman & Joel Brinkley, Rice Sees Iraq Training Progress But Offers 
No Schedule for Exit: Senate Democrats Confront Nominee at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
19, 2005), available at 
http:/ !query .nytimes.com/ gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05EED B 133 8F93AA257 52COA9639C8 
863 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained 
that "the determination of whether interrogation techniques are consistent with our 
international obligations and American law are made by the Justice Department"). 
299. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-29; see supra Part IV(A). 
300. See generally Robert Bejesky, The SSC/ Investigation of the Iraq War: Part II: 
Politicization of Intelligence, 40 S.U. L. REV. 243 (2013); Bejesky, Intelligence Information, 
supra note 176, at 875-82. 
301. Graham, supra note 149, at 77 (stating that "there was no extensive legal debate, 
even within the Pentagon, concerning these interrogation methods," and that "[m]any, if not 
most, attorneys within the building were completely unaware that these methods had been 
approved"); Victor Hansen, A Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 
50 S. TEX. L. REV. 617, 638 (2009) (a small circle of advisors shut JAGs out of the process). 
Rear Admiral Don Guter, a former Navy JAG officer, explained that "[i]f we-we being the 
uniformed lawyers-that is, the lawyers who are in the U.S. military-had been listened to 
and what we said put into practice, then these abuses would not have occurred." Senator 
Harry Reid, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Statement on Nomination of Alberto Gonzales 
(Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/2005/02/03/reid-statement-on-
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detention abuse, states that the Secretary of Defense should have used 
"the legal resources of the Services' Judge Advocates and General 
Counsels" and obtained "a wider range of legal opinions and a more 
robust debate regarding detainee policy and operations."302 
Had the Bush Administration not hid legal advice as classified 
national security secrets, military attorneys may have had more of a 
reasonable opportunity to voice objections. However, a competing 
position is that JAG attorneys and the military generally did not need to 
be consulted and were not empowered to challenge the standards. 303 
Professors Yoo and Sulmasy wrote an article that challenged the 
contention that JAG attorneys should have provided legal counsel on 
detention and interrogation methods because doing so would have 
violated constitutional restrictions that ensure that there is civilian 
control over the military, enter JAG attorneys into domains in which 
they do not normally provide advice, and involve military lawyers in 
legal consultation when the "war on terror" was different from previous 
wars.304 
Yoo and Sulmasy's contention that JAG attorneys might cause a 
separation of powers dilemma by "resisting civilian policy choices" is 
theoretically reasonable,3°5 but JAG attorneys are also mandated by 
their professional obligations to impart advice on combat and related 
nomination-of-alberto-gonzales/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). There was some high-level 
military consideration because Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora expressed his concerns 
three times to Haynes during December 2002 and January 2003 and believed that 
interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay may be torture. SENATE ARMED SERVICES 
COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at xxi; SANDS, supra note 63, at 139-40 (noting that there were 
warnings). However, Haynes was one of the four prime legal advisers who issued opinions 
that were condemned by scholars. 
302. SCHLESINGER, supra note 175, at 36. 
303. In March 2003, a Department of Defense Working Group issued 
recommendations for interrogation and opined what level of abuse would constitute torture 
under international law. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197. The military was instructed to 
accept the legal standards set by the Attorney General's Office of Legal Counsel. Detention 
Policies and Military Justice: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Personnel of the S. 
Comm. of Armed Services, 109th Cong. 15 (2005); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197, at 
24 (noting that "in wartime, it is for the President alone to decide what methods to use to 
best prevail against the enemy"). Orders consistent with OLC advice were applied in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. FAY, supra note 206, at 24-25; MAJ. GEN. GEOFFREY MILLER, 
ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN 
IRAQ 2 (2003). 
304. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A 
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1818-23, 1842-43 
(2007); Hansen, supra note 301, at 639 (disagreeing with Sulmasy and Yoo and noting that 
the authors exhibit a lack of understanding over the U.S. Constitutional structure). 
305. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 304, at 1834. 
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concerns to commanders on a regular basis306 and avert military 
personnel from violating criminal laws.307 Foremost consternation 
arose over whether to extend Geneva Convention Prisoner of War 
protections to detainees, such as for alleged members of the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda;308 and whether crimes under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice were committed, such as murder, manslaughter, maltreatment, 
battery, and assault. 309 
In the capacity of legal advisor, there is no need to be overly-
restrictive310 and oppose the government's preference, assuming the 
legal advisor offers reasonable advice. 311 Perhaps there is a threshold 
306. Laura Dickinson, Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and the Problem of 
International Law Compliance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355 (2010) (article devoted to 
discussions with JAG attorneys and depicting that they are consulted daily on numerous 
legal issues relating to combat and operations); Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 304, at 1835-36 
(stating that there are elevated concerns for legal doctrine during combat). 
307. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-26, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR 
LAWYERS, R. l.13(c) (1992), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r27_26.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("If a lawyer for the Army knows that an officer ... is engaged 
in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is either 
a violation of a legal obligation to the Army or a violation of law which reasonably might be 
imputed to the Army the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest 
of the Army."); Kramer & Schmitt, supra note 228, at 1426. 
308. Jennifer Elsea, Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees" in the War on Terrorism, 
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, at summary (Jan. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL3136701132005.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (stating that foreigners and human rights organizations have 
been especially critical of the denial of POW status to all combatants and that "[t]he 
publication of executive branch memoranda document[ ed] the internal debate about the 
status of prisoners"). 
309. 10 U.S.C. §§ 893, 918, 919, 928 (2010). 
310. John Yoo, A Crucial Look at Torture Law, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2004), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/06/opinion/oe-yoo6 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("A 
lawyer must not read the law to be more restrictive than it is just to satisfy his own moral 
goals, to prevent diplomatic backlash or to advance the cause of international human rights 
law."). With respect to reciprocal obligations among states, such as to fulfill human rights 
standards that are binding on all governments, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides that a treaty is to be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(1). It does not say "treaties should be interpreted in light of every 
possible loophole, excuse, exception, and rationalization that can be conjured to avoid the 
object and purpose of the treaty." The Convention further states that the ordinary meaning 
of a treaty should be followed unless the meaning is "ambiguous or obscure" or "leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Id. art. 32. It does not say that "a 
government should adopt manifestly absurd and unreasonable interpretations of human 
rights treaties to make the ordinary meaning of the treaty ambiguous or obscure." Id. 
311. Barron & Lederman, supra note 31, at 985-87, 998, 1006-07, 1015-17, 1031, 
1037-38, 1042, 1044-45, 1055, 1059-60, 1067-68, 1075, 1078, 1083, 1091 (noting that the 
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up to which advice should be assumed to be objective, but when 
opinions exceed this threshold of reasonableness with loopholes and 
technicalities that dismiss more orthodox interpretations of the law so to 
promote preferences of the government client, it seems highly probable 
that the advice could contort the view of the best interest of the ultimate 
client-the American public. 
V. CONCLUSIONS ON PATH DEPENDENCE 
This article maintains that human rights abuses might have been 
virtually inevitable as a path dependent outcome based on the Bush 
Administration's assumption of ubiquitous peril, open invitation to 
justify its policy preferences when it requested legal memos, and control 
over the national security apparatus. Several appointed legal advisers, 
who were prone to appease,312 produced advice with loopholes313 that 
contended the President has an all-puissant Commander in Chief 
authority that permits ignoring binding treaties and customary 
international law, that necessity and self-defense formed exigency to 
nullify laws that would otherwise restrict interrogations, that 
Afghanistan was a "failed state" without a lawful government, that 
distinctively classifying combatants and torture meant that detainees 
could be interrogated, and that the Taliban was more like a "militant, 
terrorist group" than a formal military. Effectively, the Bush 
Administration "construct[ ed] a judicially-endorsed practice of 
permissible torture"314 and hid the advice that contended how directives 
would be legal. Ironically enough, the approach of hiding information 
in the past, the Attorney General's office did impart diversity in opinions and did not always 
aggrandized executive war power). 
312. Legal memos were written by OLC lawyers with "clear Republican credentials 
and affiliations," and those who reviewed the memoranda were "all Republican-appointed 
or at least Republican-affiliated officials." David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 
YALE L.J. 548, 606 (2009); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (2007) 
(calling the memos advocacy briefs rather than objective opinions). 
313. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the 
Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 295, 355 (2007) (opining that 
legal advisors intentionally produced "forward-leaning" memos to "see how far the CIA and 
the military could go without breaking the law, and how far the law could be stretched to 
move the line farther forward still"); Vanessa Blum, Culture of Yes: Signing Off on a 
Strategy, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 2004, at 1 ("Guided by a determination to prevent another 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil, strong loyalty to the president, and in some cases an ideological 
disdain for international law, government attorneys sought ways to justify White House 
policies in the war on terror, much as a corporate lawyer might exploit loopholes in the tax 
code."). 
314. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the 'Ticking Bomb, ' in THE TORTURE 
DEBATE In AMERICA 71 (Karen J. Greenberg, ed. 2006). 
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in the national security apparatus, promoting a public agenda, and then 
using the national security apparatus as a scapegoat, was frightfully 
similar to the Bush Administration's false claims that led to the war in 
Iraq. 315 
The Bush Administration endowed American agents with a 
legal right to engage in the widespread use of interrogation methods that 
resulted in torture, kidnapping, unlawful detentions, and even deaths;316 
knew of the abuse;317 promoted legal advisors318 when they could have 
315. Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 176, at 875-82. In one specific 
piece of key information, the CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence requested analysts to 
write a "murky" paper to "lean far forward and do a speculative piece" and if you were to 
"stretch to the maximum the evidence you had, what could you come up with?" SELECT 
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S. SENATE, REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S 
PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, s. REP. No. 108-301, at 306-07 (2004) 
(committee staff interview with CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence). The paper's scope 
note affirmed that it was "purposely aggressive in seeking to draw connections" and written 
for White House "senior policymaker interest in a comprehensive assessment of Iraqi links 
to al-Qa'ida." Id. at 305-07. Congressman Peter Hoekstra places blame on the intelligence 
hierarchy: "I think you've got a systemic problem here. I think the [intelligence] 
community is incompetent. It is arrogant . . . [I]t's become political." Transcript: Reps. 
Harman, Hoekstra on 'FNS', Fox NEWS (Dec. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,317011,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). The 
Bush Administration regarded the information, much of it rumors, as serious in making 
threat claims to the American public. Robert Bejesky, The SSC! Investigation of the Iraq 
War: Part I: A Split Decision, 40 S.U. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2012); Bejesky, Intelligence 
Information, supra note 176, at 859-63; Bejesky, CFP, supra note 110, at 22-29. The war 
may have cost American taxpayers upwards of $3 trillion. See generally, JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE 
IRAQ CONFLICT (W. W. Norton & Company ed., 2008). 
316. ARNOVE, supra note 262, at 18-24; McCOY, supra note 49, at 116; Bejesky, 
Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-36 ( citing scholars contending that it is rather probable that 
the Bush Administration committed crimes). 
317. Leila Nadya Sadat, International Legal Issues Surrounding the Mistreatment of 
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